Conditional Spending and Compulsory Maternity by Huberfeld, Nicole
Boston University School of Law 
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law 
Faculty Scholarship 
2010 
Conditional Spending and Compulsory Maternity 
Nicole Huberfeld 
Boston University School of Public Health; Boston University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nicole Huberfeld, Conditional Spending and Compulsory Maternity, 2010 University of Illinois Law Review 
751 (2010). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/885 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship 
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at 
Boston University School of Law. For more information, 
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1376449
HUBERFELD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2010 10:32 AM 
 
751 
CONDITIONAL SPENDING AND 
COMPULSORY MATERNITY† 
Nicole Huberfeld* 
More than forty-six million Americans are uninsured, and many 
more are seeking government assistance, which makes congressional 
spending for federal programs a significant issue.  Federal funding of-
ten comes with prerequisites in the form of statutory conditions.  This 
Article examines the impact that conditions placed on federal health-
care spending have on the individuals who rely on that spending by 
exploring the ongoing disconnect between Spending Clause jurispru-
dence and women’s reproductive rights.  The first Part reviews the 
foundational Supreme Court precedents and places them in context 
from both a statutory and theoretical perspective.  The second Part 
studies what the author denominates “pure funding statutes” and 
“conscience clause funding statutes.”  The third Part explores the con-
tours of conditional spending jurisprudence in an effort to determine 
where individual protection may fit within the existing conditional 
spending jurisprudence.  The Article concludes that the Supreme 
Court could protect the interests of individuals if its existing condi-
tional spending test is applied in full, which has not been the Court’s 
practice.  The Article also concludes that, given the makeup of the 
Roberts Court and the balance of Congress, the better solution could 
be legislative constitutionalism.  In other words, Congress should re-
move these funding limitations from legislation—not only because 
such limitations may be unconstitutional but also because they 
represent an ongoing disconnect in the law that aggrandizes the 
spending power. 
 
 †  Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and 
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 308 n.188 (1992) (describing the term compul-
sory maternity in historical context).  Feminists in the mid-1800s railed against marriage as a form of 
legalized prostitution wherein women were subjected to the sexual whims of their husbands and were 
forced, by the ever-strengthening physician movement, to end access to midwives and to abortion, to 
bear children as a matter of “duty” in marriage.  See id. at 308–10.  The larger ideal of autonomy for 
women involved freeing women from the physical demands of marriage and childbearing as well as an 
overlapping desire for mental freedom through such rights as suffrage.  See id. 
 *  Willburt D. Ham Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.  Many 
thanks to Susan F. Appleton; the participants in the International Conference on Feminist Constitu-
tionalism; the participants in the Washington University School of Law Works-in-Progress Workshop; 
and the University of Cincinnati Faculty Forum.  Thanks to Todd Allen and Anna Girard for diligent 
research assistance.  Thanks always DT. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Lack of health insurance is widely understood to create a barrier to 
healthcare services in the United States.1  At a time when more than for-
ty-six million Americans are uninsured,2 and many more are seeking 
government assistance to access healthcare due to job losses and em-
 
 1. See SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, LOSING GROUND: HOW THE 
LOSS OF ADEQUATE HEALTH INSURANCE IS BURDENING WORKING FAMILIES 14–15 (2008), http:// 
www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/SurveyPg_Collins_losing_ground_biennial_survey_200.pdf (de-
scribing how loss of insurance creates barriers to medical care); KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND 
THE UNINSURED, THE UNINSURED: A PRIMER 8 (2009), http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7451-
05.pdf (reporting that the uninsured are more likely to forego or postpone medical care than the in-
sured; one statistical example given is that about twenty-four percent of uninsured adults had to forgo 
care in 2008 because of cost, compared to four percent of those covered by private health insurance); 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., WOMEN’S HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE FACT SHEET 2 (2008), 
http://www.kff.org/womenshealth/upload/6000_07.pdf (“Uninsured women are more likely to lack 
adequate access to care, get a lower standard of care when they are in the health system, and have 
poorer health outcomes. . . . Women who are younger and low-income are particularly at risk for being 
uninsured, as are women of color, especially Latinas . . . .”). 
 2. According to the United States Census Bureau, the number of uninsured was 46.3 million in 
2008.  CARMEN DENAVA-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA SMITH, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2008, at 
20 (2009), http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-236.pdf. 
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ployment benefit cutbacks,3 the conditions placed on government spend-
ing for healthcare are a particularly current issue.  The expansion of the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) in the first weeks of the 
Obama administration signaled that the federal government may be will-
ing to respond to this nationwide need, but federal funding often de-
mands a sacrifice from the recipient, known as conditions on spending.4  
Congress has long been understood to have not only the power to spend 
“for the general welfare” but also to have the authority to attach condi-
tions to the funds that the recipient (whether state or individual) must 
accept to receive the funds.5  The nation’s major public healthcare pro-
grams, such as Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP, are all conditional spend-
ing programs.6  Given the desire to expand and revise such programs, it is 
important to consider the impact that conditions placed on federal 
healthcare spending may have on the individuals who rely on that spend-
ing.   
The predicament is that the Supreme Court’s Spending Clause juri-
sprudence often evaluates conditions on spending in such a way that it 
fails to recognize the individuals affected by conditional spending.  The 
Court’s major decision regarding conditional spending, South Dakota v. 
Dole, focused on the federal-state relationship in setting forth a test for 
understanding the constitutional boundaries limiting Congress’s ability to 
place conditions on federal funds.7  That benchmark facilitated a discon-
nect, however, that analytically separates the individual from the condi-
tional spending program, a divide that has allowed Congress to impinge 
on individual rights when it could not otherwise do so. 
Examining the Court’s decisions allowing state and federal govern-
ments to burden the privacy right to obtain abortion by withholding 
funds in public healthcare programs, particularly Medicaid, provides a 
striking example of this disconnect.  This area of the law is deserving of 
mining for a number of reasons.  First, the legislative intent of the restric-
tions on federal spending for reproductive services is unusually clear, as 
the chief sponsor and author of the legislation, known as the Hyde 
Amendment, openly desired to impede all women’s access to abortion.8  
Knowing that Congress could not place direct obstacles in the path of all 
 
 3. See Kevin Sack & Katie Zezima, Growing Need for Medicaid Puts Added Financial Burden 
on States, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/us/ 
22medicaid.html. 
 4. See Robert Pear, Obama Signs Children’s Health Insurance Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, at 
A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/05/us/politics/05health.html?scp=2&sq=SCHIP&st= 
cse. 
 5. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 203 (1987). 
 6. See Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a Post-Deficit 
Reduction Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 10 (2006). 
 7. See Dole, 482 U.S. at 203–04. 
 8. Representative Hyde stated during the floor debate of the so-called Hyde Amendment: “I 
certainly would like to prevent, if I could legally, anybody having an abortion, a rich woman, a middle-
class woman, or a poor woman.  Unfortunately, the only vehicle available is the HEW medicaid [sic] 
bill.”  123 CONG. REC. 19,700 (1977) (statement of Rep. Hyde). 
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women seeking to terminate pregnancy, Representative Hyde chose to 
burden those women who rely on Congress for healthcare services by vir-
tue of the federal funding mechanism of Medicaid.9  
Second, the Hyde Amendment and its progeny serve as a micro-
cosm for studying the ways in which conditional federal spending impacts 
individuals, particularly those who are most vulnerable.  Studies show 
that funding remains one of the greatest obstacles to healthcare access 
generally10 and abortion access specifically for poor women, who forego 
basic needs, seek unsafe abortions, or are forced to bear the child.11 
Third, the Hyde Amendment helped to lay the foundation for the 
jurisprudence allowing such use of conditional spending, which can be 
found in the 1977 decision Maher v. Roe12 and the 1980 decision Harris v. 
McRae.13  These two key precedents held that while neither state nor 
federal government may place obstacles in the path of a woman’s exer-
cise of her right to terminate pregnancy, the government “need not re-
move obstacles not of its own creation.”14  The Court deemed indigency 
to be a woman’s individual problem, and refusal to pay for abortion to 
encourage a policy of childbirth was adjudged constitutionally permissi-
ble.15  Given the Court’s imprimatur, the Hyde Amendment acted as an 
incentive for states to refuse to pay for termination of pregnancy, even 
when a woman’s health is jeopardized, because the federal government 
does not match the funds spent on poor women for such medical care.   
Fourth, the Hyde Amendment and the jurisprudence upholding its 
constitutionality spawned many similar federal funding limitations; cur-
rently, at least eight federal laws prohibit spending on abortion and re-
lated services.16  These statutes can be divided into two categories, what 
this Article denominates “pure funding statutes” and “conscience clause 
funding statutes.”  The sheer number of pure funding and conscience 
clause funding statutes highlights the breach created and maintained in 
 
 9. See Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976).  The original “Hyde Amendment” 
has been modified through the years; sometimes it has allowed federal matching funds when terminat-
ing pregnancy is necessary for the life of the mother, sometimes it also includes funds for cases involv-
ing rape or incest (this is true of the current version).  See Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-8, div. F, tit. V, §§ 507–508, 123 Stat. 524, 802–03. 
 10. For example, according to recently published data, forty percent of uninsured women did not 
have a Pap test, compared to twenty percent of insured women; fifty-one percent of uninsured women 
did not have a regular doctor, whereas only twelve percent of insured women had no regular doctor; 
and sixty-seven percent of uninsured women needed care but did not get it due to cost, compared to 
nineteen percent of insured women.  KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 1, at 2. 
 11. See 123 CONG. REC. 19,700–01 (1977) (statement of Representative Hyde) (noting that stu-
dies he had read indicated women on welfare would bear the children and not seek unsafe abortions); 
see also Marlene Gerber Fried, The Hyde Amendment: Thirty Years of Violating Women’s Rights, 
OVERBROOK FOUND. NEWSL. (Overbrook Found., New York, N.Y.), Winter 2006, http://www. 
overbrook.org/newsletter/06_11/pdfs/hrs/Civil_Liberties_And_Public_Policy_Program.pdf. 
 12. 432 U.S. 464, 474, 480 (1977). 
 13. 448 U.S. 297, 308–09 (1980). 
 14. See id. at 316–17. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See discussion infra Part III. 
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the law between the condition on spending and the individual generally 
and protecting women’s reproductive access specifically.  Further, Bush 
administration Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) reg-
ulations would have allowed healthcare providers to thwart women’s ef-
forts to obtain certain health services and jeopardized not only access to 
abortion, but also to contraception, which stretches the Maher and 
McRae precedents to their limits.17 
The national import of conditional spending programs such as Me-
dicaid cannot be overstated,18 but the use of their power to blockade the 
exercise of constitutionally protected rights demands consideration of the 
third party in the spending relationship, the individual affected by the 
conditions accepted by the state.  The role of the third party is played not 
only by women, but also by the physicians and other healthcare providers 
who are most affected by conditions on spending.19  Together, they high-
light the gap that exists between conditional spending jurisprudence and 
the impact conditional spending has on individuals participating in feder-
al healthcare programs. 
This Article explores the disconnect between Spending Clause juri-
sprudence and individual rights, ultimately suggesting that the Dole test’s 
focus on the federal-state relationship is too narrow.  Programs such as 
Medicaid concern not only the intergovernmental relationship but also 
the beneficiary of the federal scheme, who is more than simply a third 
party to an agreement between the federal and state government.  The 
individual should be better represented in the analysis; programs en-
trenched in the idea of cooperative federalism are not fulfilling their 
purpose if they fail to serve the individuals who benefit from such initia-
tives.  The first Part of this Article reviews the caselaw, seeking to place 
the precedents in context from both a statutory and theoretical perspec-
tive.  Reviewing the caselaw illuminates that the Court’s analysis of these 
laws as Spending Clause legislation is deficient.  The second Part of this 
Article studies the numerous pure funding and conscience clause funding 
statutes that extend the reach of Maher and McRae beyond their initial 
scope.  Understanding the use of the spending power to create the nu-
merous statutes described in this Part helps to highlight the use of condi-
tional spending to coerce individuals who rely on federal healthcare pro-
grams both for benefits and for recompense.  The third Part of this 
 
 17. Ensuring that DHHS Funds Do Not Support Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practic-
es in Violation of Federal Law, 73 Fed. Reg. 78,072, 78,072 (Dec. 19, 2008) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 
pt. 88). 
 18. See Sara Rosenbaum, supra note 6, at 6.  Professor Rosenbaum wrote: 
Without Medicaid revenues, the nation would witness the collapse of an already burdened system 
of publicly-supported clinics and public hospitals and health systems that serve the poor, includ-
ing a substantial number of program beneficiaries.  In sum, Medicaid’s role in financing health 
care for low-income and seriously and chronically ill and disabled populations makes it an essen-
tial part of the U.S. health care landscape. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 19. See id. at 46 (discussing the participation of physicians and hospitals in such plans). 
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Article explores the contours of conditional spending jurisprudence in an 
effort to determine where individual protection may fit within the exist-
ing framework more readily than it does now.  The Article concludes 
that the Dole test could protect the interests of individuals when applied 
in full, which is not the Court’s current practice.  The Article further con-
cludes that Congress should cease inserting such funding limitations in its 
healthcare legislation not only because it may be unconstitutional, but 
also because it greatly hinders women’s access to fundamental medical 
services. 
II. CONDITIONS IN THE CASELAW 
This Part explores the caselaw that facilitated the growth of pure 
funding statutes and conscience clause statutes.  Though the caselaw 
combines two lines of decisions, privacy rights to obtain abortion and 
federal spending, the spending analysis largely has been ignored.  Before 
tracing the Court’s precedents chronologically, this Part provides some 
background to place the jurisprudence in context.  Ultimately this Part 
shows that the caselaw has two distinct but interrelated threads: first, 
conditional federal funding impacts state law in important ways; and 
second, governmental denial of funding affects individuals’ ability to ex-
ercise their rights.  The problem addressed herein lies at the cross-section 
of these two theoretical strands. 
A. Statutory and Theoretical Context 
The caselaw is best understood with three background components 
in mind: the structure and intent of the Medicaid program, the “greater 
includes the lesser” theory, and the debate over positive and negative 
rights.  Congress enacted the Medicaid Act as companion legislation to 
Medicare in 1965.20  Medicaid was structured to provide medically neces-
sary care to what were dubbed the “deserving poor,” people who fit 
within certain categories—such as pregnant women, dependent children, 
the elderly, the blind, and the disabled—and who also met the govern-
ment’s definition of poverty.21  Each state submits a plan (the “State 
Plan”) to the federal government describing how the state intends to 
comply with the mandatory elements of the Medicaid Act and in which 
permissive elements the state would like to participate.22  Thus, even 
though each state has its own plan, the Medicaid Act deliberately re-
quires all states to ensure that all Medicaid enrollees, statewide, have 
 
 20. See Medicaid Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1396–1396w-2 (Westlaw through Feb. 2009 amendments)); ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY 
STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA 51–53 (1974).  
 21. See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 20, at 57. 
 22. The State Plan, in addition to the state’s per capita income, determines the amount of the 
federal match for that state’s Medicaid program.  Id. at 59. 
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access to certain mandatory medical services, which include inpatient and 
outpatient hospital care, physician services (regardless of the place of 
service), long term care, and laboratory and radiology services.23  In so 
mandating, Congress departed from the predecessor legislation, known 
as Kerr-Mills, which had provided healthcare funding to the states with 
little guidance.24  In other words, for all who qualified, Medicaid was de-
signed to provide consistent access for five simple but far-reaching cate-
gories of medical care (and allowed states to choose from many more op-
tional categories, such as prescription drugs, which all states cover).25  
Medicaid has become a classic federal conditional spending program. 
The Medicaid program is often described as an “entitlement” 
program, by which different commentators mean to implicate different 
theories of public spending and its enforceability by recipients.26  One 
such theory is the positive/negative rights theory of constitutionally 
protected individual rights.27  Usually the theory is expressed as the idea 
that the government must refrain from impinging certain rights protected 
by the constitution (negative rights), but it need not facilitate the exercise 
of those rights (positive rights).28  Those who want to limit the legal 
entitlement also tend to want to describe constitutional rights as negative 
in nature.29  The negative/positive dichotomy is a convenient method to 
describe the way that the Constitution was drafted, but it is an 
anachronism considering the amount of money the federal government 
spends “for the general welfare” and with conditions attached that are 
designed to influence behavior.  As Professor Kreimer noted twenty-five 
years ago, the active/inactive distinction that accompanied a bounded 
concept of state power seems “coarse” in the modern era, when the reach 
of government “has extended far into areas previously reserved to the 
family, market and church, and this extension confounds easy definition 
of positive and negative rights.”30  In the context of the power to spend, 
 
 23. See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 20, at 65–66. 
 24. See Kerr-Mills Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 86-778, 74 Stat. 924 (1960); STEVENS & 
STEVENS, supra note 20, at 51, 66–67. 
 25. See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 20, at 65–66. 
 26. Susan Frelich Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributions of the 
Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81 COLUM. 
L. REV. 721, 734 n.98 (1981). 
 27. See id. at 734–35 n.99. 
 28. See id. at 734–38 (describing the negative/positive rights theory and applying it to the abor-
tion-funding cases). 
 29. See id. at 734–35. 
 30. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 
132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1326 (1984); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
489 U.S. 189, 191 (1989) (holding that a state social services agency did not violate the constitutional 
rights of a child who was being abused by his father when the agency recorded the suspected abuse but 
did not protect the child from his father, who ultimately beat the child so badly that he became per-
manently and severely mentally retarded).  Justice Brennan’s dissent pointedly rejected the majority’s 
description of and reliance on the positive/negative rights distinction.  DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203–05 
(Brennan, J., dissenting).  Justice Brennan wrote: 
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wholesale acceptance of the positive/negative rights distinction seems 
particularly dangerous, as the government deliberately uses this power to 
influence behavior.  Its distinction from criminal sanctions is arguably a 
matter of degree not kind.31 
The positive/negative rights theory overlays another substrate, the 
“greater includes the lesser” theory of government spending.32  The Su-
preme Court has intermittently adopted the idea that Congress is not re-
quired to spend on certain programs, and therefore Congress can attach 
conditions as it chooses to any program when it does decide to provide 
federal funding for a particular purpose.33  The “greater includes the less-
er” theory has been used to justify allowing governmental infringements 
of constitutional rights by virtue of conditions on spending; in other 
words, the theory supports the idea that indirectly infringing rights is 
permissible so long as the vehicle for infringing rights is the placement of 
conditions on spending, which proponents argue can always be accepted 
or rejected by the beneficiary of the spending.34  Thus, the infringement 
becomes a choice to waive a right rather than a governmental burden on 
that right.  This theory dominated Justice Rehnquist’s interpretation of 
the power to spend, and, as will be discussed below, it has been particu-
larly prevalent in cases involving pure funding statutes.35 
 
I would recognize, as the Court apparently cannot, that “the State’s knowledge of [an] individu-
al’s predicament [and] its expressions of intent to help him” can amount to a “limitation . . . on his 
freedom to act on his own behalf” or to obtain help from others. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . To put the point more directly, . . . a State’s prior actions may be decisive in analyzing 
the constitutional significance of its inaction. . . . 
. . . . 
As the Court today reminds us, “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
was intended to prevent government ‘from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument 
of oppression.’”  My disagreement with the Court arises from its failure to see that inaction can 
be every bit as abusive of power as action, that oppression can result when a State undertakes a 
vital duty and then ignores it. 
Id. at 207, 208, 211–12 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (citing the majority opinion).   
 31. See Kreimer, supra note 30, at 1296–97 (“The greatest force of a modern government lies in 
its power to regulate access to scarce resources.”). 
 32. See Kreimer, supra note 30, at 1304–14 (describing and deconstructing the theory); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (With Particular Reference 
to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 597–98 (1990) (describing the “Holmesian” 
view of federal spending that the “supposedly greater power not to create the program includes the 
supposedly lesser power to impose the condition”). 
 33. The theory is most often attributed to Justice Holmes, who articulated the “greater includes 
the lesser” theory in a variety of contexts (not just government spending).  See, e.g., Hammer v. Da-
genhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 54 
(1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 34. Kreimer, supra note 30, at 1304 n.31. 
 35. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (applying the theory by upholding selective 
Title X spending for family planning services); see also Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a 
Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1184, 1190 & n. 12 (1990) (de-
scribing the court’s long-standing yet occasional use of the doctrine to indicate that “the State’s ‘great-
er’ power not to bestow the benefit or privilege at all incorporates a ‘lesser’ power to provide it condi-
tionally” and providing a history of the theory); Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the 
Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could 
Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 460, 485–86 (2003) (describing the Rehnquist approach to 
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These three background points help to illuminate the themes that 
emerge in the caselaw.  Conditional federal funding clearly has had an 
impact on state law; indeed, as is discussed below, the conditional spend-
ing test from South Dakota v. Dole focuses only on the federal-state rela-
tionship.36  When the state does not deliver the conditional spending 
benefits, individuals sometimes have been prevented from enforcing the 
benefits created by the conditions the federal government imposed on 
the state, leaving them with no recourse when the state’s failure harms 
the individual.37  Under the “greater includes the lesser” theory, and for 
those jurists that adhere to a negative rights theory of the Constitution, 
this is the desired outcome.38  The Court’s rejection of individual en-
forcement efforts emphasizes the problem described herein, that the in-
dividual is deliberately removed from the conditional spending analysis, 
even when Congress intended that the individual benefit from the condi-
tional spending scheme.39 
B. The Federal Funding Decisions 
In 1973, the Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade that the right to 
privacy that had been at the root of the decisions protecting use of con-
traceptives in Griswold v. Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird extended 
to the decision whether or not to terminate a pregnancy.40  An enormous 
amount of litigation has followed Roe, but one strain can be singled 
out—those cases related to government funding.  This line of cases can 
be traced to Singleton v. Wulff,41 which often is cited for recognizing and 
exploring exceptions to the third-party standing prohibition.42  But Jus-
tice Blackmun’s 1976 opinion also discussed the import of funding to 
both the physician and the patient involved in a decision to terminate 
pregnancy.43  In evaluating Missouri’s prohibition on use of Medicaid 
 
Spending Clause jurisprudence as the “‘greater includes the lesser’ argument” and noting that the 
Rehnquist Court was unlikely to abandon this approach); Kreimer, supra note 30, at 1308–09 (describ-
ing Justice Rehnquist’s reliance on the doctrine). 
 36. See infra Part IV.B. 
 37. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 333, 344 (1997); Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Tri-
angle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413, 428–
38 (2008) (describing the progression of cases that initially allowed § 1983 causes of action broadly and 
that has narrowed individual access to the courts through § 1983 over time). 
 38. See Huberfeld, supra note 37, at 429–30; see also Sunstein, supra note 32, at 598–99. 
 39. Though this Article focuses on federal spending, state and local spending create similar prob-
lems, especially when the state or local government refuses to fund the exercise of a fundamental right.  
See, e.g., Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (holding that a city’s refusal to fund “nontherapeu-
tic” abortions in a local public hospital, while funding childbirth, did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause because, based on Maher v. Roe’s holding, a Constitution of negative rights does not require 
the government to fund the exercise of positive rights (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)). 
 40. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973). 
 41. 428 U.S. 106 (1976). 
 42. See, e.g., Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 479 (2006); Campbell v. Louisiana, 
523 U.S. 392, 397 (1998); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991). 
 43. The Missouri statute at issue prohibited use of Medicaid funds to pay for any abortion that 
was not “medically necessary.”  Physicians who participated in Medicaid challenged the nonpayment 
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funds for so-called nontherapeutic abortions, the Court noted that “[a] 
woman cannot safely secure an abortion without the aid of a physician, 
and an impecunious woman cannot easily secure an abortion without the 
physician’s [sic] being paid by the State.  The woman’s exercise of her 
right to an abortion, whatever its dimension, is therefore necessarily at 
stake here.”44  Justice Blackmun further observed that lack of funding 
could pose an obstacle in accessing abortion, noting that “unless the im-
pecunious woman can establish Medicaid eligibility she must forgo abor-
tion.”45  Though these statements were support for the standing prin-
ciples enunciated by the Court, they showed recognition that funding is 
an obstacle for poor women making reproductive decisions.46 
Four years after Roe v. Wade was decided, the Court heard the 
companion cases Beal v. Doe and Maher v. Roe.47  Beal held that the Me-
dicaid Act did not require states to pay for nontherapeutic abortions, a 
decision based on statutory interpretation.48  Maher involved a Connecti-
cut law that limited state Medicaid benefits to medically necessary first 
trimester abortions.49  Justice Powell’s majority held that states do not vi-
olate the Equal Protection Clause if they choose not to fund nonthera-
peutic abortions in their Medicaid programs, the implication of which 
was that a state that pays for childbirth need not also pay for abortion in 
its Medicaid program.50  Both statutory analysis and constitutional law 
grounded this holding, but the key aspect of the majority opinion was 
that the Equal Protection Clause was not violated because poverty is not 
a suspect classification51 and the law otherwise passed rational basis re-
 
policy for both themselves and their patients.  See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 108–11.  Thus, Justice Black-
mun’s statements were made within the context of the close physician-patient relationship that facili-
tated standing for the plaintiff-physicians. 
 44. Id. at 117. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Justice Powell, who wrote the majority in Maher v. Roe and who repudiated the idea in both 
cases that the state was interfering with the decision to have an abortion by refusing to fund it, focused 
on this in his dissent.  See id. at 128–29 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 47. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).  It also heard Poelker v. 
Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977), which held that a city-owned public hospital (also in Missouri) could 
refuse to provide abortion services without violating the Equal Protection Clause based upon the 
analysis in Maher v. Roe.  Interestingly, it appears that this trio of cases marked a divergence between 
Justice Blackmun and Justice Powell.  Though Justice Powell supported Justice Blackmun’s analysis in 
Roe v. Wade, his majority opinion in Maher and its companion cases departed from Justice Black-
mun’s view of the Roe precedent.  See Linda Greenhouse, How the Supreme Court Talks About Abor-
tion: The Implications of a Shifting Discourse, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 41, 41–42, 49–50 (2008). 
 48. Pennsylvania limited payment for abortions to those certified as “medically necessary” by 
three physicians, where medical necessity equated to a threat to the health of the mother, defects of 
the fetus, rape, or incest.  See Beal, 432 U.S. at 441–42.  The Court held that the Medicaid Act did not 
require Pennsylvania to pay for all abortions that were technically legal under Pennsylvania law, even 
though the Medicaid Act required states to provide access and payment for certain categories of medi-
cal care.  See id. at 444; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (1976).  The Court called abortion “unneces-
sary—though perhaps desirable—medical services,” which the state was not obliged to cover.  See 
Beal, 432 U.S. at 444. 
 49. Maher, 432 U.S. at 466. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Justice Powell wrote: 
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view.52  The Court stated that even though medical costs associated with 
carrying a pregnancy to term are much higher than paying for abortion, 
the state’s decision was rational because the state may encourage “nor-
mal” childbirth,53 which the Court did not deem to be an “obstacle” for 
poor women.54  The Court stated in dicta that it believed historical mores 
supported the state’s interest in encouraging childbirth, writing: “[A] 
State may have legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of popu-
lation growth.  Such concerns are basic to the future of the State and in 
some circumstances could constitute a substantial reason for departure 
from a position of neutrality between abortion and childbirth.”55  This 
dicta suggests that maternity may be imposed on women who depend on 
government funds for medical care,56 a Victorian notion that also impli-
cates the fundamental right to procreate.57 
Further, while states had always had some flexibility in the Medic-
aid program, allowing states to shun one particular medical procedure 
that would otherwise be covered as an outpatient hospital or physician 
service ignored the statutory framework of the Medicaid Act58—as well 
as its purpose, to ensure that indigent citizens would have equal access to 
medically necessary services.59  Medicaid was created to secure medical 
assistance for individuals “whose income and resources are insufficient to 
meet the costs of necessary medical services.”60  Every woman seeking 
abortion must have the help of a physician to pursue her medical goals, 
just as a woman giving birth seeks medical care for prenatal services and 
 
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacle—absolute or otherwise—in the pregnant woman’s 
path to an abortion.  An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a 
consequence of Connecticut’s decision to fund childbirth; she continues as before to be depen-
dent on private sources for the service she desires.  The State may have made childbirth a more 
attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman’s decision, but it has imposed no restriction 
on access to abortions that was not already there.  The indigency that may make it difficult—and 
in some cases, perhaps, impossible—for some women to have abortions is neither created nor in 
any way affected by the Connecticut regulation.  We conclude that the Connecticut regulation 
does not impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe. 
Id. at 474. 
 52. See id. at 479.  Justice Powell urged that  
[t]here is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and state 
encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy.  Constitutional con-
cerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose its will by force of law; the State’s power to 
encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader. 
Id. at 475–76. 
 53. The district court found this financial decision on the part of the state to be irrational.  See id. 
at 468. 
 54. Id. at 474. 
 55. Id. at 478 n.11. 
 56. The district court noted, “To sanction such a justification would be to permit discrimination 
against those seeking to exercise a constitutional right on the basis that the state simply does not ap-
prove of the exercise of that right.”  Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 664 (D. Conn. 1975). 
 57. Compare Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that the right to procreate is a 
fundamental liberty), with Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (holding that mandatory sterilization is 
within the State’s powers). 
 58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1398w-2 (Westlaw through Feb. 2009 amendments). 
 59. See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 20, at 57.   
 60. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396w-2 (Westlaw through Feb. 2009 amendments). 
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labor and delivery.61  Denying Medicaid payment, then, effectively fore-
closed indigent women from obtaining this medical care.62  The Court’s 
analysis separated the right to obtain abortion from realization of the 
right, as Justice Blackmun noted, an analysis that reflects the “greater in-
cludes the lesser” theory of spending.63  At the time, very little jurispru-
dence existed regarding the Spending Clause, but Maher generated a line 
of cases that would support this philosophy. 
The misconceptions regarding the Medicaid program and individu-
als’ reliance on it continued a few years later in Harris v. McRae.64  De-
cided in 1980, McRae involved a statutory issue regarding whether states 
were required to fund medically necessary abortions after the Hyde 
Amendment prevented use of federal funding.65  The Court analyzed the 
most restrictive version of the Hyde Amendment, a provision that only 
permitted use of Medicaid funds in very limited circumstances.66  The 
Court found that states were not required to pay for services that the 
federal government would not fund, because Medicaid is a cooperative 
federalism program that involves matching funds, not unfunded man-
dates.67   
Evaluating the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, the Court 
relied heavily on its decision in Maher.  Justice Stewart compared the 
Hyde Amendment to Connecticut’s funding moratorium and reiterated 
that refusal to fund does not place an “obstacle” in the path of a woman 
seeking to terminate pregnancy.68  Instead, the majority determined that 
the Hyde Amendment, like the law at issue in Maher, encouraged an ac-
tivity “deemed in the public interest.”69  Even though the Court reite-
rated the legitimacy of the Roe decision, it held that refusal to fund 
should not to be equated with a “penalty” even when medically neces-
 
 61. See Sylvia A. Law, Childbirth: An Opportunity for Choice that Should Be Supported, 32 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 345, 372–77 (2008) (describing how definitions of medical necessity 
and courts’ interpretations of that terminology are at odds with women’s health needs). 
 62. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 455 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Justice Marshall revealed 
the Court’s legerdemain, stating: “As the Court well knows, these regulations inevitably will have the 
practical effect of preventing nearly all poor women from obtaining safe and legal abortions.”  Id.  Jus-
tice Marshall also noted the disparate impact on non-white women of such policies and argued that the 
Court’s equal protection analysis was flawed.  See id. at 459–60. 
 63. See id. at 462–63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 64. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
 65. Id. at 297. 
 66. Id. at 302–03.  This was an important difference from Maher, in which Connecticut was pay-
ing for so-called medically necessary abortions.  Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 466 (1977).  The Hyde 
Amendment, in contrast, does not pay for medically necessary abortions except for a few limited cir-
cumstances, i.e., the life of the mother is endangered or cases of rape or incest.  McRae, 448 U.S. at 
302–03. 
 67. McRae, 448 U.S. at 309–10.  This would never have been a strong argument, given that Medi-
caid is a federal matching fund program.  The plaintiffs might have been more successful arguing that 
the Hyde Amendment was inconsistent with the statutory goals of Medicaid, but nothing can be 
gained from playing armchair litigator. 
 68. Id. at 314–15. 
 69. Id. at 315. 
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sary services are not covered.70  The Court also refused to consider that 
the Hyde Amendment was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.71   
Justice Brennan’s dissent noted, however, that refusal to pay is a de-
liberate effort to prevent the exercise of a constitutionally protected 
right.72  Justice Brennan described the Hyde Amendment as a withdrawal 
of funds for medically necessary services that would otherwise be paid 
for by Medicaid.73  In other words, the decision to provide federal spend-
ing for healthcare had already been made, and abortions had been paid 
for by Medicaid until the Hyde Amendment’s passage.  The Court did 
not evaluate the legislative history of the amendment, which supported 
Justice Brennan’s assertion that in  
both design and . . . effect it serves to coerce indigent pregnant 
women to bear children they would otherwise elect not to have. 
When viewed in the context of the Medicaid program to which 
it is appended, it is obvious that the Hyde Amendment is nothing 
less than an attempt by Congress to circumvent the dictates of the 
Constitution and achieve indirectly what Roe v. Wade said it could 
not do directly.74 
Representative Hyde unequivocally stated that he would end all 
abortions if he could, but that the Medicaid Act was the only way that he 
could flex his legislative muscle.75  Representative Hyde also subscribed 
to and advanced the Victorian more that a woman naturally should want 
to be a mother, stating: “When a pregnant woman, who should be the 
natural protector of her unborn child, becomes its deadly adversary, then 
it is the duty of this legislature to intervene . . . .”76  The Court’s lack of 
analysis regarding this clear legislative history is startling, given how 
 
 70. Id. at 317 n.19.  The Court wrote: “A refusal to fund protected activity, without more, cannot 
be equated with the imposition of a ‘penalty’ on that activity.”  Id.  The Court also reiterated the Mah-
er holding that poverty is not a suspect classification and thus no Equal Protection Clause violation 
occurred because legitimate state interests are served in protecting potential life that are rationally 
expressed by encouraging childbirth.  Id. at 322–23. 
 71. Id. at 322–23.  A number of scholars have critiqued the decision based upon its Equal Protec-
tion analysis (or lack thereof).  See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Essay, Equality Theory and Reproductive Free-
dom, 3 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 99, 102–16 (1994); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical 
Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 270 n.28 
(1992); Sunstein, supra note 32, at 617–19. 
 72. McRae, 448 U.S. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 73. Id. at 329. 
 74. Id. at 330–31. 
 75. 123 CONG. REC. 19,700 (1977) (statement of Rep. Hyde). 
 76. Id. at 19,701.  This statement not only supports Justice Brennan’s dissent, it furthers argu-
ments made by Professor Siegel, then-Judge Ginsburg, and other scholars that the Equal Protection 
Clause is violated when the state interferes in reproductive decisions.  See Siegel, supra note 71, at 
326–28; see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe 
v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 385 (1985).  Sex-based discrimination had just begun to receive interme-
diate scrutiny in 1980, and the Court had resisted articulating a stricter standard of review for many 
years.  See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 209–10 (1976); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1561–65 (2d ed. 1988). 
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open the proponents of the Hyde Amendment were about their goals.77  
Representative Hyde even stated that he knew that women would not 
have access to abortion if Medicaid did not pay for it; yet, the Court did 
not mention or discuss this questionable funding condition.78 
Ten years later, Rust v. Sullivan continued the reasoning of Maher 
and McRae.79  Rust involved the Public Health Services Act (Title X) 
Funding for Family Planning Clinics, which provides federal grants to 
public and nonprofit private entities willing to create family planning 
clinics that include services for low income populations, rather than Me-
dicaid.80  The statute forbids granting federal funds to “programs where 
abortion is a method of family planning.”81  Petitioners challenged the 
regulations interpreting Title X, claiming they were outside the bounds 
of the statute and violated constitutional rights, including the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.82  Describing the “authority” the gov-
ernment possesses under McRae and Maher, the Court held that Con-
gress could refuse to fund both abortions and abortion counseling to 
promote childbirth.83  Once again, the Court engaged in an unspoken 
“greater includes the lesser” analysis and described that this choice in 
funding is not the same as a penalty and leaves women in same position 
as if the federal funding did not exist at all.84  The Court also reiterated 
that the indigency that may preclude access to other family planning clin-
ics or services is not a problem of the government’s making and thus not 
its duty to change.85  Chief Justice Rehnquist observed in a footnote that 
Congress has the power to ensure that funds are properly applied to the 
intended federal use and that the regulations worked in furtherance of 
that goal.86  Chief Justice Rehnquist also recognized that, though it was 
not applicable in Rust, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prevents 
the government from placing a condition on the recipient of federal 
funds that prevents engaging in constitutionally protected behavior, the 
very issue that was ignored in McRae and Maher.87  As Justice Black-
mun’s dissent noted, this is precisely the problem with the Title X “gag 
rule”: the government forces Title X recipients to “distort” information 
 
 77. As Professor Perry stated in his forceful deconstruction of McRae, it is clear that Congress 
was acting based on the idea that abortion is per se objectionable, which under the “narrowest cohe-
rent reading of Roe” is impermissible.  Michael J. Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in 
the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1113, 1121 
(1980). 
 78. 123 CONG. REC. 19,700–01 (1977) (statement of Rep. Hyde). 
 79. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–93 (1991). 
 80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300–300a-6 (2006). 
 81. Id. § 300a-6. 
 82. Rust, 500 U.S. at 181. 
 83. Id. at 192–93. 
 84. Id. at 193, 201. 
 85. Though Rust was heard after South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), discussed infra, the 
Court did not engage in a Spending Clause analysis.  Rust, 500 U.S. 173. 
 86. Rust, 500 U.S. at 195 n.4. 
 87. Id. at 196–97. 
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so that the right to abortion cannot be exercised.  In Justice Blackmun’s 
view, this was no different than if the federal government “banned abor-
tions outright.”88 
In 2001, Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, a case with an analogous 
issue, was decided in the opposite manner.89  In Velazquez, the Court 
held that despite the broad power that accompanies federal funding, 
Congress could not prohibit the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) from 
representing clients who presented challenges to the welfare program as 
a whole.90  The Kennedy majority attempted to distinguish its reasoning 
from Rust by describing limits on LSC counsel as limits on speech that 
completely prevented welfare recipients from challenging certain aspects 
of welfare law and policy, which the majority found improperly impacted 
the justice system as a whole and completely prevented the plaintiffs 
from making certain legal arguments.91  The Court distinguished Velaz-
quez from Rust by reasoning that the women who seek reproductive 
health counseling at Title X centers had other avenues to learn of abor-
tion and related services.92  Though Justice Scalia’s dissent urged that this 
analysis militated toward finding that the restrictions on the LSC were 
permissible, it seems that the opposite conclusion is even more persua-
sive—Rust was wrongly decided.93  The Court’s arguments are unpersua-
sive, as the impositions on the legal profession are equally troubling for 
the medical profession.  The funding restrictions operate in the same 
manner; the plaintiffs in Velazquez were as limited in hiring private 
counsel as the plaintiffs in Rust were limited in utilizing private funding 
(and just as women enrolled in Medicaid are limited in seeking private 
medical services), and each of these limits prevents access to a legal ser-
vice. 
A year after Rust, the Court decided Planned Parenthood of Sou-
theastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,94 which also drew on the faulty founda-
tion of Maher and McRae.  Though Casey was not a Spending Clause–
related case, its analysis of governmental interference with abortion is 
pertinent to the current discussion.  Justice O’Connor’s plurality reduced 
the standard of review from strict scrutiny to an “undue burden” analysis 
that had been used in dicta in prior abortion cases but that had not be-
come the official standard of review.95  In so doing, the joint opinion at-
tempted to describe what would constitute an undue burden by the state 
on a woman’s exercise of her privacy right, relying in part on Maher and 
 
 88. Id. at 218 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Consistent with his majority opinion in Roe v. Wade, 
Justice Blackmun focused on the intrusion into the physician-patient relationship and the key role a 
physician plays in a woman’s decision to continue or terminate a pregnancy.  Id. 
 89. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 540–43. 
 92. Id. at 546–47. 
 93. See id. at 553–55 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 94. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 95. Id. at 874. 
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McRae: “The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not de-
signed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it 
more difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be 
enough to invalidate it.”96  As with Maher and McRae, the Casey Court 
ignored the burden placed on a woman of no means when abortion be-
comes more expensive as well as the state’s intent to “strike at the right 
itself.”97  Paradoxically, Justice O’Connor further explained: “[F]inding 
of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regula-
tion has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path 
of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”98  The Court used 
this language and analysis similar to that in Maher and McRae to uphold 
such state obstacles as a twenty-four-hour waiting period between infor-
mation regarding abortion and performance of the procedure.99 
Decided fifteen years later by the newly composed Roberts Court, 
Gonzales v. Carhart built on the foundation of the aforementioned pre-
cedents.100  Again, though not a spending case, Carhart is relevant to the 
spending analysis because it continues the reasoning begun in Maher and 
McRae.101  Justice Kennedy “assumed” that Roe and Casey remained 
good precedent and, in so doing, also relied on the obstacle language 
from Casey that drew from Maher and McRae.102  Thus, the refusal to 
recognize the kind of state action that can result in an obstacle to the in-
dividual who seeks to exercise constitutionally protected rights contin-
ued. 
C. Trends 
The line of spending-related caselaw exposes at least two trends.  
First, in contrast to the nearly constant tinkering with the Roe precedent, 
the doctrine from Maher and McRae has remained remarkably steady, 
allowing an ongoing impact on the exercise of individual rights.  This 
unwavering reliance on Maher and McRae has permitted the Court to 
continue a fallacy in its analysis, that the government does not unduly 
burden a woman’s privacy right by refusing to pay for abortion in federal 
spending programs while favoring childbirth.  The Court ignored clear 
legislative history in its analysis of the state’s intent when analyzing “un-
due burden,” which has allowed Congress and the states to burden this 
 
 96. Id.  
 97. Conspicuously, the law at issue was called the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, and the 
state had been attempting to limit access to abortion since Roe v. Wade was decided.  See Brief of Peti-
tioners and Cross-Respondents at 2–5, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
(No. 91-744) (describing the many incarnations of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act and the 
many federal court decisions that struck down Pennsylvania’s attempts to prevent abortion). 
 98. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
 99. Id. at 885–86. 
 100. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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particular right in ways that likely would be impermissible for other fun-
damental rights.103  Such an analysis can exist by virtue of the “greater in-
cludes the lesser” theory and is reinforced by continued interest in the 
positive/negative rights dichotomy.  Both theories ignore the reality of 
modern government, which rides not only on the deterrent effect of crim-
inal punishment but also on the coercive effect of pervasive federal fund-
ing.104   
Second, the Court’s acceptance of these sister precedents affords 
Congress exceptionally broad power under the Spending Clause to use 
conditions on spending to prohibit use of federal funds for abortion, 
thereby influencing state policy, private policy, and the rights of both 
physicians and individual women.  But the congressional authority 
created by Maher and McRae has grown beyond its original context, as 
Congress has created not only pure funding statutes that prohibit 
payment for abortion but also conscience clause statutes that prohibit 
recipients of federal funds from controlling the behavior of their 
healthcare providers.105  The funding statutes that are the legacy of Maher 
and McRae are explored next. 
III. LEGISLATIVE LEGACY 
A surprising number of conditional spending statutes have sprouted 
from the fertile soil of Maher and McRae.  The first type are “pure fund-
ing statutes,” meaning laws that forbid use of federal funds for abortion 
procedures and/or abortion counseling.  The second type are “conscience 
clause funding statutes,” meaning laws that forbid recipients of federal 
funds from discriminating against those healthcare providers who refuse 
to participate in abortion or abortion counseling on religious or moral 
grounds.106  The two varieties of statutes have given Maher and McRae 
broad influence that may reach beyond the abortion realm into general 
reproductive services, including contraception and sterilization, for both 
 
 103. See supra Part II.B. 
 104. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative 
Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 331 (1985). 
 105. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1093a (2006); 20 U.S.C. § 1688 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7b (2006). 
 106. Some urge that conscience clause statutes are an important, or at least legitimate, method for 
protecting the First Amendment rights of healthcare providers.  See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Objections 
in Conscience to Medical Procedures: Does Religion Make a Difference?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 
818–25 (arguing that religious exemptions reflected in conscience clauses tend to be constitutionally 
legitimate but that moral objection clauses may be unprotected); Leslie C. Griffin, Conscience and 
Emergency Contraception, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y, 299, 312–13, 317 (2006) (explaining that 
the Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence allows legislatures to create conscience-based legal 
exemptions); Maxine M. Harrington, The Ever-Expanding Health Care Conscience Clause: The Quest 
for Immunity in the Struggle Between Professional Duties and Moral Beliefs, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
779, 808, 832–33 (2007) (arguing providers should be able to refuse to provide healthcare procedures 
because of moral objections, but conscience clause legislation should balance the interests of the pa-
tient); Robert K. Vischer, Conscience in Context: Pharmacist Rights and the Eroding Moral Market-
place, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 86 (2006) (urging use of the market to balance the rights of phar-
macists who have moral objections and patients who seek access to legal prescriptions).  
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women in public programs and women who have private insurance.  
These laws also reveal the breadth of Congress’s power to place condi-
tions on federal funds in ways that surely run afoul of current Spending 
Clause jurisprudence and reflect the permissiveness of the “greater in-
cludes the lesser” model for conditional spending statutes.  Moreover, 
these statutes reach beyond the Medicaid program into programs such as 
Medicare (the social insurance program for the elderly) to place limita-
tions on healthcare providers in unexpected ways. 
A. Pure Funding Statutes 
The Hyde Amendment, a short but powerful rider to federal appro-
priations legislation, affects two major conditional spending programs, 
Medicaid and CHIP.107  The Hyde Amendment was first passed as a rider 
to the annual Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and De-
partment of Labor appropriations bill in 1976 as a response to the deci-
sion in Roe v. Wade.108  The Hyde Amendment has been renegotiated 
and modified each year, which has resulted in the exceptions for rape, in-
cest, and health being dropped, added, and dropped again, but it is al-
ways attached to the funding for DHHS, the agency responsible for Med-
icare, Medicaid, and CHIP.109  The current version of the amendment 
includes exceptions for the life of the mother, rape, and incest, but not 
for the health of the mother or for fetal abnormalities.110  Representative 
Hyde stated during the floor debate: “I certainly would like to prevent, if 
I could legally, anybody having an abortion, a rich woman, a middle-class 
woman, or a poor woman.  Unfortunately, the only vehicle available is 
the HEW medicaid [sic] bill.”111  This language is important to under-
stand because it has been attached to several other federal spending pro-
grams, either written into the legislation creating the program or added 
by riders to appropriations bills. 
 
 107. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396w-2 (Westlaw through Feb. 2009 amendments) (Medicaid); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1397ee(c)(1) (2006) (SCHIP). 
 108. Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976). 
 109. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-447, div. F, §§ 507(a), 508(a), 118 
Stat. 2809, 3163 (2004) (prohibiting federal funds for Health and Human Services programs, including 
Medicaid, from being used for abortions, except in cases of rape, incest, or if the life of the mother is 
endangered; notably, prohibitions on use of federal funds pervade this public law, including prohibi-
tions on use of funds for abortions for the Department of Justice, for the military, for overseas 
projects, and for federal employee health benefits); Pub. L. No. 103-112, § 509, 107 Stat. 1082, 1113 
(1993); Pub. L. No. 98-619, § 204, 98 Stat. 3305, 3321 (1984); Pub. L. No. 97-12, § 402, 95 Stat. 14, 95–96 
(1981); see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 441.200–.208 (2008). 
 110. Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, div. F, tit. V, §§ 507–508, 123 Stat. 
524, 802–03. 
 111. 123 CONG. REC. 19,700 (1977) (statement of Rep. Hyde).  Representative Hyde retired at 
the end of 2006 and passed away in late 2007.  Despite Representative Hyde’s retirement at the end of 
2006, the Hyde Amendment has not been repealed or rejected by Congress yet.  Some believe that 
Democrats have been afraid to repeal the amendment because it would highlight the Medicaid pro-
gram in a way that could lead to general reductions in Medicaid funding.  See Heather D. Boonstra, 
The Heart of the Matter: Public Funding of Abortion for Poor Women in the United States, 
GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 12, 16 (2007), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/10/1/gpr100112.pdf. 
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1. Medicaid 
As was described above, Medicaid is a classic cooperative federal-
ism program by which the federal government agrees to match funds that 
states spend to provide “medical assistance” to certain very poor citizens 
pursuant to a State Plan.112  Medicaid is structured to cover the needs of 
certain “categorically” poor, thus the program only covers about forty 
percent of all of the nation’s poor.113  The Medicaid Act obligates states 
to provide medical assistance for enrollees in certain categories of medi-
cal care, and the states generally must provide the same benefits to all 
enrollees, a funding condition known as comparability.114  Among the 
items that must be covered are the cost of care and/or services for both 
outpatient hospital services and physician services for all Medicaid enrol-
lees.115  Despite these requirements, the Hyde Amendment has been a 
condition on the federal funding for Medicaid since 1977; though it has 
not been codified in the Medicaid Act,116 the ban is written into the regu-
lations for Medicaid.117  Technically the Hyde Amendment only ad-
dresses the DHHS distribution of federal funds; it does not prohibit 
states from paying for abortion.118  But states have no obligation to pay 
for those services that the federal government will not fund (under 
McRae),119 rendering the Hyde Amendment effectively a condition on 
federal spending. 
Some basic statistics highlight the impact of funding restrictions 
such as the Hyde Amendment.  About twelve percent of all women of 
childbearing age were enrolled in Medicaid as of 2006, and women com-
prise sixty-nine percent of the adult beneficiaries in Medicaid.120  Of the 
adult women enrolled in Medicaid, nearly two-thirds are of child-bearing 
age.121  Medicaid pays for forty-one percent of all births nationally and 
more than half of the births in certain states.122  Medicaid covers prenatal 
care, childbirth, and postnatal services,123 and coverage of pregnant wom-
 
 112. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396w-2 (Westlaw through Feb. 2009 amendments). 
 113. Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A); KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID’S ROLE FOR SELECTED 
POPULATIONS (July 16, 2009), http://facts.kff.org/chart.aspx?ch=464.  
 114. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B).  Even states with special waivers (called section 1115 waiv-
ers) have to adhere to comparability.  See id. § 1315 (2006).  Under a recent Medicaid modification, 
however, states with approved plans called Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) benchmark plans need not.  
See id. § 1396u-7.  
 115. See id. § 1396d(a)(2), (4). 
 116. The abortion restriction was included in the DRA provisions that permitted states to use 
certain kinds of managed care for Medicaid populations.  See id. § 1396u-2(e)(1)(B). 
 117. 42 C.F.R. § 441.200 (2009). 
 118. Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976). 
 119. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980). 
 120. See Boonstra, supra note 111, at 12; KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID’S ROLE FOR 
WOMEN 1 (2007), http://www.kff.org/womenshealth/upload/7213_03.pdf [hereinafter MEDICAID’S 
ROLE FOR WOMEN]. 
 121. See MEDICAID’S ROLE FOR WOMEN, supra note 120. 
 122. See id. 
 123. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(l) (Westlaw through Feb. 2009 amendments).   
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en is the category with the highest financial threshold for enrollees (at 
133 percent of the federal poverty level).124  Medicaid also funds family 
planning through an enhanced federal match to states, resulting in Medi-
caid covering sixty-one percent of all federal spending for family plan-
ning, though family planning cannot cover abortion or counseling regard-
ing abortion.125  In 2009, the federal poverty level for one person was 
$10,830 and $3,740 was added for each additional person in a house-
hold.126  The women who qualify for Medicaid are extremely poor; they 
can barely cover basic necessities such as housing and food, let alone 
medical care. 
Though Medicaid is not specifically a women’s healthcare program, 
many women depend on Medicaid for access to medical care, and the 
policies implemented through Medicaid spending have a disproportio-
nate impact on women in general.127  Women enrolled in Medicaid tend 
to be not only of childbearing age and poor but also less educated, mi-
norities, and parents.128  As of 2004, five percent of white women were 
covered by Medicaid, while twelve percent of Hispanic women and four-
teen percent of African American women were Medicaid enrollees.129  
Conditions placed on use of Medicaid funds are likely to have a greater 
impact on women of color.  This was one of the many concerns expressed 
by the members of the House that opposed the Hyde Amendment.  Rep-
resentative Parren Mitchell, speaking on behalf of the Black Caucus, 
stated: 
There is simply no denying that the effect of the Hyde amendment 
would be to exclude only those of limited financial means from 
access to legal abortions.  Medicaid funds are the primary Federal 
moneys used to pay for abortions, and according to [HEW], some 
250,000 to 300,000 abortions were paid for with Federal funds in 
1975. . . . the Hyde amendment is discriminatory legislation. . . . 
Black women are disproportionately represented among the poor 
and are relatively more likely to need the assistance of Medicaid to 
 
 124. See MEDICAID’S ROLE FOR WOMEN, supra note 120.  Many states cover pregnant women up 
to 185 percent of the federal poverty level, as permitted by federal law.  See id. 
 125. See id.  The enhanced match is ninety cents to every ten cents states spend; the usual federal 
match is between fifty percent and seventy-six percent of the state’s spending on its Medicaid enrollees 
depending on the state and its poverty level.  Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(C). 
 126. See Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 4199, 4200 (Jan. 23, 2009) 
(delineating federal poverty guidelines for the Department of Health and Human Services). 
 127. When the Hyde Amendment was passed, the House contained only eighteen female repre-
sentatives: “I would say that if there were 417 women in this House instead of 417 men, and if there 
were 18 men instead of 18 women in this House, that we would not be faced with this amendment to-
day.”  123 CONG. REC. 19,708 (1977) (statement of Rep. Holtzman).   
 128. See MEDICAID’S ROLE FOR WOMEN, supra note 120. 
 129. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., WOMEN AND HEALTHCARE: A NATIONAL PROFILE 16 (2005), 
http://www.kff.org/womenshealth/upload/Women-and-Health-Care-A-National-Profile-Key-Findings-
from-the-Kaiser-Women-s-Health-Survey.pdf [hereinafter WOMEN AND HEALTHCARE].  Interesting-
ly, thirty-eight percent of Hispanic women were then uninsured, compared to seventeen percent of 
African American women and thirteen percent of white women, perhaps indicating an outreach prob-
lem.  Id. 
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obtain the same abortion that their wealthier sisters will be able to 
obtain in any case.130 
Though this statement was made in 1977, it remains true more than thirty 
years later. 
Even though rates of abortion have been decreasing nationally, the 
trends among poor women and women of color tell a different story.131  
Before the Hyde Amendment was passed, just thirteen states had 
enacted abortion funding bans; but by 1979, forty states had terminated 
state coverage for abortions not covered by federal Medicaid matching 
funds.132  Currently, seventeen states use their own funds to provide cov-
erage for abortions that may not be paid for with federal funds.133  Before 
Congress ended federal funding, Medicaid paid for almost one-third of 
all abortions—about 300,000 annually—after, the federal government 
has paid for virtually none.134  The rate of abortion has been increasing 
for all poor women since 1994, and black and Hispanic women consis-
tently have abortions at higher rates than white women.135  Relatedly, be-
tween 1994 and 2001, the unintended pregnancy rate rose for Latinas and 
poor women, which made them more likely to turn to abortion.136  Wom-
en of color and poor women are more likely to delay obtaining an abor-
tion due to the effort to raise money;137 an abortion in the first trimester 
on average costs $430, whereas in the second trimester it costs an average 
of $1260.138  Given the current federal poverty level, a single woman 
enrolled in Medicaid in a state that allows childless adults to enroll at one 
hundred percent of the poverty level can make no more than $902.50 per 
 
 130. 123 CONG. REC. 19,710–11 (1977) (statement of Rep. Mitchell). 
 131. Justice Marshall predicted that they would in Beal, writing: 
It is no less disturbing that the effect of the challenged regulations will fall with great dispar-
ity upon women of minority races.  Nonwhite women now obtain abortions at nearly twice the 
rate of whites, and it appears that almost 40% of minority women . . . are dependent upon Medi-
caid for their health.  Even if this strongly disparate racial impact does not alone violate the Equal 
Protection Clause, “at some point a showing that state action has a devastating impact on the lives 
of minority racial groups must be relevant.” 
Beal v. Roe, 432 U.S. 438, 459–60 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 132. Fried, supra note 11, at 2. 
 133. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., ABORTION IN THE U.S.: UTILIZATION, FINANCING, AND 
ACCESS (2008), http://www.kff.org/womenshealth/upload/3269-02.pdf [hereinafter ABORTION IN THE 
U.S.]. 
 134. See 123 CONG. REC. 19,709 (1977) (statement of Rep. Weiss); see also ADAM SONFIELD ET 
AL., GUTTMACHER INST., OCCASIONAL REPORT NO. 38, PUBLIC FUNDING FOR FAMILY PLANNING, 
STERILIZATION AND ABORTION SERVICES, FY 1980–2006, at 18 (2008) (finding that the federal gov-
ernment contributed to the cost of 191 abortion procedures in 2006, and states paid for the remainder 
of the 177,000 government-funded abortions). 
 135. See ABORTION IN THE U.S., supra note 133.  A 2002 study showed African American wom-
en’s abortion rates to be 49/1000 and Hispanic women’s rates to be 33/1000, whereas European Amer-
ican women’s rate was 13/1000.  Id. 
 136. See HEATHER D. BOONSTRA ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., ABORTION IN WOMEN’S LIVES 
26–28 (2006), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2006/05/04/AiWL.pdf. 
 137. See id. at 29. 
 138. ABORTION IN THE U.S., supra note 133. 
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month to remain qualified for Medicaid.139  As the procedure has become 
more concentrated among the women who are enrolled in Medicaid, it 
has become more clear that women must divert money for essentials such 
as rent, food, utilities, clothing, and other necessities in order to be able 
to financially access the procedure.140 
2. CHIP 
CHIP is a spending program that provides federal funds to states to 
provide healthcare coverage to low-income uninsured children and their 
families.141  CHIP is a federal block grant program, though, so its struc-
ture is notably different from Medicaid’s.  Whereas Medicaid is an en-
titlement for both the state and the individual, CHIP limits the federal 
funds provided to states and specifically is not an entitlement for its 
enrollees.142  Also, whereas Medicaid covers several categories of eligible 
enrollees, CHIP was written specifically to cover children who do not 
qualify for Medicaid but who are near-poor (states decided to cover their 
parents too).143  Finally, whereas Medicaid imposes no limit to the federal 
match, CHIP is capped at a set federal dollar amount each year.144 
The Hyde Amendment would have affected CHIP as it affects Me-
dicaid; the Amendment forbids DHHS to spend federal funds on abor-
tion in most circumstances,145 and DHHS administers CHIP.146  When 
CHIP was enacted in 1997, however, the Hyde language was written into 
the legislation rather than depending on an annual rider.147  As with Me-
dicaid, CHIP funds may not be used for abortion except in extraordinary 
circumstances: “[A]ny health insurance coverage provided with such 
funds may include coverage of abortion only if necessary to save the life 
 
 139. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., WHERE ARE STATES TODAY? MEDICAID AND STATE-
FUNDED COVERAGE ELIGIBILITY LEVELS FOR LOW-INCOME ADULTS (2009), http://www.kff.org/ 
medicaid/upload/7993.pdf. 
 140. Geography and state waiting periods add additional financial hurdles.  See Colker, supra  
note 71, at 116–20 (discussing the role poverty should play in reproductive rights analysis).  Reporting 
in early 2009 indicated an increase in abortions and vasectomies due to the economic recession, which 
is consistent with the decision making occurring among the poor already.  David Crary & Melanie S. 
Welte, Doctors See Economic Impact on Abortion, Birth Control, USA TODAY, Mar. 24, 2009, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-03-24-family-planning_N.htm.  Women who have partici-
pated in studies regarding who has abortions and the reasons for the procedure have consistently indi-
cated that lack of financial resources is a primary reason for having an abortion.  See LAWRENCE B. 
FINER ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., REASONS U.S. WOMEN HAVE ABORTIONS: QUANTITATIVE AND 
QUALITATIVE PERSPECTIVES 112–13, 115 (2005), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/psrh/full/3711005. 
pdf. 
 141. 42 U.S.C. § 1397aa (Westlaw through Feb. 2009 amendments). 
 142. See id. § 1397bb(b)(4). 
 143. See id. § 1397aa(a). 
 144. See id. § 1397dd(b). 
 145. Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976). 
 146. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2006). 
 147. Id. § 1397ee(c)(1). 
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of the mother or if the pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or in-
cest.”148 
Many of the demographics that exist within Medicaid are also true 
for CHIP.  Though teenage pregnancy had been declining from 1990 un-
til 2004, an increase in teen pregnancy occurred between 2005 and 
2006.149  Teen abortion rates have also been falling, but both the pregnan-
cy rates and the abortion rates are higher among African American and 
Hispanic teens.150  Again, many of the statistics and demographics are 
reminiscent of Medicaid.151  The CHIP pure funding limitations are po-
tentially more constant, because the CHIP funding limitation is written 
as a condition of receiving federal funds within the CHIP statute itself.152  
Also, the restrictions in CHIP are a deliberate limitation on minors’ 
access to reproductive health services, a group that would have even 
more difficulty accessing healthcare than most given that minors often 
need parental support in the form of consent, financial contributions, and 
the like to access healthcare services. 
3. Other Federal Programs 
Legislators have added Hyde-style language to other appropriations 
bills, thereby denying federal funding for abortion coverage in varied 
programs such as federal employees,153 federal prisoners,154 military per-
sonnel and their families,155 Native Americans,156 Peace Corps volun-
teers,157 and foreign aid programs.158  Many of the spending limitations 
that can be described as pure funding statutes are appropriations bill rid-
ers, much like the Hyde Amendment. 
 
 148. Id.; id. § 1397jj(a)(16). 
 149. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SEXUAL HEALTH OF ADOLESCENTS AND YOUNG ADULTS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 1 (2008), http://www.kff.org/womenshealth/upload/3040_04.pdf. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text. 
 152. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(c)(1). 
 153. Federal Employees Health Benefits Program funding facilitates this limitation.  See Consoli-
dated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110-161, §§ 615–616, 121 Stat. 1844, 2015 (2008) (allowing 
payment only in instances of life endangerment, rape, or incest).   
 154. Id. §§ 202–204, 121 Stat. at 1912–13.  These Department of Justice funding provisions en-
compass both pure funding and conscience clause funding, as they provide that the funds cannot be 
used to provide for abortion except to save the life of the mother or in instances of rape, but also that 
prison guards need not participate in the transportation of female prisoners for such medical services if 
it contradicts their personal beliefs.  See id.   
 155. 10 U.S.C. § 1093(a) (2006). 
 156. Indian Health Service Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1676 (2006). 
 157. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 
No. 109-102, 119 Stat. 2172, 2184 (2006). 
 158. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(f) (2006) (referred to as the “global gag rule” or the “Mexico City 
Policy”).  President Obama issued an executive order during his first week in office to reverse the 
Bush administration’s policy of preventing use of foreign aid funds to organizations that provide coun-
seling about or services for abortion.  See Rob Stein & Michael Shear, Funding Restored to Groups 
that Perform Abortions, Other Care, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2009, at A3.  The so-called “Mexico City 
Policy” started with President Reagan, was rescinded by President Clinton, reinstated by George W. 
Bush, and has now been rescinded again by President Obama.  Id. 
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Hyde-style language has had some severe results.  For example, the 
healthcare program for military members and their families, known as 
the TRICARE program,159 contains the following prohibition: “Funds 
available to the Department of Defense may not be used to perform 
abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the 
fetus is carried to term.”160  The TRICARE regulations clarify that abor-
tions performed in the case of “fetal abnormalities”—including anence-
phaly (the complete lack of a cranial cavity)—are not covered.161  A re-
cent case highlights the brutal implications of this limitation.162  Mrs. 
Britell was the wife of an Air National Guard captain and in the midst of 
a highly desired pregnancy but learned that the fetus was anencephalic.163  
She was advised by her physician that anencephaly is untreatable and al-
ways fatal, and that she could terminate the pregnancy or carry to term 
and be induced, but either way the fetus would not survive.164  After con-
sulting with her husband, her priest, grief counselors, and others, she de-
cided to terminate the pregnancy but learned after the induced-labor 
procedure that TRICARE would not pay for the abortion.165  As the dis-
trict court noted, TRICARE pays for all medically necessary healthcare 
services but excludes abortion, including abortion for severe fetal ab-
normalities, from the payment scheme.166  Mrs. Britell argued that the 
TRICARE regulation was unconstitutional as applied to her because the 
fetus had no potential life, and therefore no state interest in life could be 
furthered.167  This tactic opened the prospect for a federal court to recon-
sider the facial challenge analyzed in McRae.  The district court agreed, 
holding that even applying the rational basis review standard from 
 
 159. 10 U.S.C. § 1072(7) (defining the TRICARE program). 
 160. Id. § 1093(a). 
 161. 32 C.F.R. § 199.4(e)(2) (2008).  Anencephaly occurs when the fetus’s skull does not form and 
thus only a brain stem, at most, develops.  Anencephaly is always fatal, usually within a week of birth.  
Because the brain does not form, anencephaly can jeopardize a woman’s life, as the hormones that 
trigger labor often are not secreted by the fetus.  Britell v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 2d 182, 185–86 
(D. Mass. 2002).  The regulation provides: 
Abortion.  The statute under which CHAMPUS operates prohibits payment for abortions with 
one single exception—where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried 
to term.  Covered abortion services are limited to medical services and supplies only.  Physician 
certification is required attesting that the abortion was performed because the mother’s life would 
be endangered if the fetus were carried to term.  Abortions performed for suspected or confirmed 
fetal abnormality (e.g., anencephalic) or for mental health reasons (e.g., threatened suicide) do not 
fall within the exceptions permitted within the language of the statute and are not authorized for 
payment under CHAMPUS.  NOTE: Covered abortion services are limited to medical services or 
supplies only for the single circumstance outlined above and do not include abortion counseling 
or referral fees.  Payment is not allowed for any services involving preparation for, or normal fol-
lowup [sic] to, a noncovered abortion.  The Director, OCHAMPUS, or a designee, shall issue 
guidelines describing the policy on abortion. 
32 C.F.R. § 199.4(e)(2) (emphasis added). 
 162. Britell, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 182. 
 163. Id. at 183. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 183–84. 
 166. See id. at 183. 
 167. Id. at 184. 
HUBERFELD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2010  10:32 AM 
No. 3] CONDITIONAL SPENDING & COMPULSORY MATERNITY 775 
McRae, the regulation was impermissible, as no legitimate state interest 
is served by forcing a woman to continue pregnancy with a brain-absent 
fetus.168 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed and held that the govern-
ment acted pursuant to the legitimate interest in promoting potential 
life.169  Relying on McRae and Maher, the circuit court determined that 
the TRICARE regulation paralleled the Hyde Amendment closely and, 
like that law, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it 
passed rational basis review.170  The circuit court, in so holding, essential-
ly determined that anencephaly is not always terminal, despite scientific 
evidence and trial court findings to the contrary.171  The Britell holding 
has traction, though, because of McRae and Maher.172  Britell also dis-
plays the deferential analysis that has occurred in these cases.  Even as-
suming rational basis review is the correct standard, it does not mean 
that courts must give the federal government a free pass on conditions on 
spending that are neither legitimate nor rational.173 
Another example of the pure funding statutes is Title X, which pro-
hibits use of federal funds for abortion (or abortion counseling).174  The 
“Gag Rule” upheld in Rust v. Sullivan175 states that “[n]one of the funds 
appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in programs where 
abortion is a method of family planning.”176  The purpose of Title X was 
to fund reproductive health (“family planning”) clinics, but those clinics 
can advise women of only certain reproductive medical options if the 
clinic accepts Title X funding.177  The clinics could provide such counsel-
ing so long as it is separated from the federal funding, but in reality clin-
 
 168. See id. at 190–91.  In concluding, the district court wrote: “Through the funding power the 
government seeks to encourage Britell and women similarly situated to suffer by carrying their anen-
cephalic fetuses until they are born to a certain death.  This rationale is no rationale at all.  It is irra-
tional, and worse yet, it is cruel.”  Id. at 198. 
 169. Britell v. United States, 372 F.3d 1370, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 170. See id. at 1380–82. 
 171. See id. at 1382. 
 172. See id. at 1383–84; see also Perry, supra note 77, at 1120–21.  Professor Perry wrote: 
McRae is inconsistent with the narrowest possible reading of Roe.  Note that under the narrowest 
coherent reading of Roe, government may not take action predicated on the view that abortion is 
per se morally objectionable.  But that is not to say that government may not take action that has 
the effect of discouraging women from terminating their pregnancies.  As far as Roe is concerned, 
such action is permissible so long as it is not predicated on the view that abortion is per se morally 
objectionable. 
Id.   
 173. The Supreme Court has occasionally struck down legislation under even its most deferential 
level of review.  See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S 432 (1985); Reed v. 
Reed, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 174. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (2006). 
 175. See supra text accompanying notes 79–88. 
 176. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–93 (1991).  If a patient asks about 
abortion, counseling and referrals may be provided pursuant to current regulations.  See 42 C.F.R. 
§ 59.5(a)(5) (2008).  Conscience clause funding limits, however, may affect this regulation, as discussed 
below. 
 177. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6. 
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ics cannot create such a “Chinese wall” and often must forgo abortion 
counseling or referrals to secure much needed federal funding.178 
The pure funding statutes primarily act upon the enrollees in federal 
healthcare programs, rather than healthcare providers, though health-
care providers are affected too because they may be limited in the servic-
es they can provide to women.  The dual effect on enrollees and health-
care providers highlights at least two concerns regarding the current 
jurisprudential status of conditional spending.  The first is the idea that 
the federal government may place conditions on federal spending so long 
as the conditions are clear to the recipient, which generally means the 
state (discussed infra).  The second involves the “greater includes the 
lesser” theory that the federal government may impose regulations by 
virtue of spending that it could not otherwise implement.  In the case of 
programs such as Medicaid, the state accepts the condition on behalf of 
its citizens, who have no ability to influence the decision.  This underlines 
the disconnect between the existing conditional spending doctrine and its 
impact on individuals; if the “greater includes the lesser” theory holds 
that citizens can waive their rights when conditioned funds are offered, 
then the theory is also plainly incorrect because such waivers are made 
on their behalf by the states who negotiate with the federal government.  
The detachment is even more drastic in the case of conscience clause 
funding statutes, which affect both the healthcare provider and the fund-
ing recipient in surprising ways. 
B. “Conscience Clauses” Tied to Funding 
Conscience clause funding statutes prevent healthcare providers 
that accept federal funds from discriminating against individuals who 
refuse to participate in abortion, sterilization, and related services.  The 
conscience clause funding statutes further the reach of the Hyde-type 
language authorized by Maher and McRae.  Though others have ex-
amined the First Amendment implications for conscience clause funding 
statutes,179 the use of conditions on federal funding to facilitate federal 
conscience clauses has not been explored.  Three conscience clause fund-
ing statutes merit brief description, as they form the basis for a regulation 
that would have greatly expanded the scope of conscience clause funding 
statutes.180 
The Church Amendments, which were originally part of Hill-
Burton hospital funding, currently apply to the receipt of federal funds 
 
 178. See, e.g., Nadine Brozan, Some Clinics Plan to Advise and Forgo Aid, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 
1991, at A1; Tamar Lewin, Abortion Rules Force Clinic to Weigh Money and Mission, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 26, 1991, at A1. 
 179. See supra note 106. 
 180. Ensuring that DHHS Funds Do Not Support Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practic-
es in Violation of Federal Law, 73 Fed. Reg. 78,072, 78,072 (Dec. 19, 2008) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 
pt.88). 
HUBERFELD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2010  10:32 AM 
No. 3] CONDITIONAL SPENDING & COMPULSORY MATERNITY 777 
related to the Public Health Service Act, the Community Mental Health 
Centers Act, and the Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities 
Construction Act.181  The Church Amendments clarify that federal fund 
recipients are not required to provide abortion or sterilization, and pre-
vent healthcare providers and other individuals in healthcare entities 
from experiencing discrimination by recipients of DHHS funds on the 
basis of their refusal to perform or participate in such healthcare servic-
es.182  Notably, the Church Amendments protect both sectarian hospitals 
that oppose abortion and sterilization procedures, and the employees of 
such hospitals who do not share their employers’ religious convictions.183  
In other words, the Church Amendments prevent a hospital from being 
forced by a patient, a doctor, or even a court to perform an abortion in 
its facility, but that hospital cannot discriminate against a medical profes-
sional who supports reproductive rights or who performs abortions or 
sterilization procedures outside the religious institution.184 
Likewise, the Danforth Amendment to Title X prohibits 
“[a]bortion-related discrimination in governmental activities regarding 
training and licensing of physicians.”185  The Danforth Amendment pre-
vents the federal government—and state and local governments that re-
ceive federal funds—from discriminating against healthcare providers 
that refuse to provide a range of abortion-related services, and protects 
doctors, medical students, and health training programs.186  This con-
science clause funding statute also protects medical training programs 
from losing accreditation status (which would otherwise jeopardize fed-
eral funding) if they refuse to train residents in abortion and steriliza-
tion.187  The Danforth Amendment intentionally protects refusals to par-
ticipate in abortion or abortion-related services for any reason, and it is 
not limited to religious objections.188 
Congress passed the Weldon Amendment (or “Hyde-Weldon 
Amendment”) in 2004 as part of an omnibus appropriations bill;189 like 
the Hyde Amendment, the Weldon Amendment has become a rider to 
 
 181. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (named after its sponsor, Senator Frank Church of Idaho). 
 182. Id. § 300a-7(b). 
 183. Id. § 300a-7(c). 
 184. The same legislative effort that created the Church Amendments in 1973 produced related 
pure funding statutes.  For instance, the Legal Services Corporation Act prevented use of federal 
funds to support litigation seeking access to “nontherapeutic” abortion, id. § 2996f(b)(8), and the For-
eign Aid Assistance Act prohibited the use of AID funds to “pay for the performance of abortions as a 
method of family planning or to motivate or coerce any person to practice abortions.”  Pub. L. No. 93-
189, § 114, 87 Stat. 714, 716 (1973).  Senator Church was involved in pushing all of these legislative 
maneuvers.  See Leora Eisenstadt, Separation of Church and Hospital: Strategies to Protect Pro-Choice 
Physicians in Religiously Affiliated Hospitals, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 135, 145–46 (2003). 
 185. 42 U.S.C. § 238n. 
 186. Id. § 238n(a). 
 187. Id. § 238n(b). 
 188. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Limits of Conscience: Moral Clashes over Deeply Divisive 
Healthcare Procedures, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 49 (2008). 
 189. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, §§ 507, 508(d), 118 Stat 2809, 
3163. 
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the annual HHS/Labor/Education appropriations legislation.190  The 
Weldon Amendment allows publicly funded institutions to refuse to pro-
vide abortion care and referrals.191  Like the Danforth Amendment, the 
Weldon Amendment is drafted with broad language that does not specify 
that a religious objection is the sole permissible objection, and it is not 
limited to the medical procedure of abortion, instead allowing all federal-
ly funded healthcare entities to refuse to “provide, pay for, provide cov-
erage of, or refer for abortions.”192 
The Church Amendments, the Danforth Amendment, and the 
Weldon Amendment formed the statutory foundation for a Bush admin-
istration regulation that was entitled “Ensuring that Department of 
Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Support Coercive or Discri-
minatory Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law.”193  The “con-
science regulation” would have required all healthcare providers that re-
ceive federal funds to certify compliance with the terms of the Church 
Amendments, the Danforth Amendment, and the Weldon Amend-
ment.194  DHHS proposed and adopted the rule after the cutoff date at 
the end of the presidential term195 “to ensure that, in the delivery of 
health care and other health services, recipients of Department funds do 
not support coercive or discriminatory practices in violation of these 
laws.”196  The conscience regulation had the potential to affect approx-
imately 572,000 healthcare providers, including hospitals, nursing homes, 
physicians, laboratories, dentists, and other allied health professionals 
(and their training programs) who accept federal funding for one aspect 
of their reimbursement.197  The Obama administration, however, has pub-
lished a proposal to repeal the rule.198 
Even if the Obama administration revises or eliminates the con-
science regulation,199 it serves to illuminate how conditional funding is 
wielded in ways that aggrandize the power to spend and create individual 
rights dilemmas.  In publishing the regulations, DHHS was aware that its 
power lay in placing conditions on spending.  Twice in responding to 
comments, DHHS stated that an entity that receives federal funds agrees 
 
 190. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 508, 121 Stat. 1844, 2209. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id.   
 193. 73 Fed. Reg. 78,072 (Dec. 19, 2008) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88). 
 194. Id. at 78,074. 
 195. Id. at 78,089.  A commenter noted that the White House had issued a directive that all new 
regulations be submitted by June 1, 2008 “except in ‘extraordinary circumstances.’”  Id.  DHHS re-
jected the commenter’s suggestion that the agency must explain the extraordinary circumstances or 
withdraw the rule, stating that the internal memorandum gave no one authority to challenge the tim-
ing of the DHHS rule.  Id. 
 196. Id. at 78,072. 
 197. Id. at 78,094.  
 198. 74 Fed. Reg. 10,207 (Mar. 10, 2009).  Though repeal has been proposed, it does not appear to 
have been completed at this time. 
 199. Id. 
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to accept that those funds may come with certain conditions.200  The first 
response was to a concern that the definition of “healthcare entity” was 
too broadly and generally stated.201  The second rejoinder was more 
pointed, responding to a concern that state law protecting access to 
emergency contraception and birth control could conflict with the new 
conscience regulation.202  DHHS chided states that they must “ensure 
that they do not take action that would violate these established federal 
protections.  By accepting federal funds, states accept the conditions that 
the Congress has imposed on the receipt of those funds.”203  The regula-
tion was so broadly worded, however, that it could protect those who are 
opposed to use of contraception, a concept that extends beyond the 
reach of McRae and Maher. 
In fact, DHHS declined to alter the wording of the regulation so 
that the term “abortion” would not include contraception, averring 
such questions over the nature of abortion and the ending of a life 
are highly controversial and strongly debated.  [DHHS] believes it 
can enforce the federal health care conscience protection laws 
without an abortion definition just as [it] has enforced the Hyde 
Amendment . . . without a formal definition.  Additionally, nothing 
in this rule alters the obligation of federal Title X programs to de-
liver contraceptive service to clients in need as authorized by law 
and regulation.204 
In other words, DHHS was aware that the regulation protected those 
who assert that contraception is the same thing as abortion (which is 
scientifically incorrect) when they refuse to prescribe or dispense contra-
ception or emergency contraception. 
DHHS also rejected the argument that this regulation could have a 
disparate impact on poor women, who rely on federally funded programs 
to access healthcare services and prescriptions.205  A number of commen-
ters expressed concern that “low-income patients, minorities, the unin-
sured, patients in rural areas, the Medicaid population, [and] other medi-
cally underserved populations” would suffer under the conscience 
regulation’s requirements.206  The DHHS response was a combination of 
platitudes and side-stepping.  First, DHHS noted that many Americans 
have problems accessing healthcare and listed a number of unrelated in-
itiatives designed to facilitate medical care for different populations.207  
Then the agency stated support for new programs that will increase 
access to healthcare for all.208  Finally, DHHS disagreed that already dis-
 
 200. 73 Fed. Reg. at 78,076, 78,088.  
 201. Id. at 78,076. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 78,088. 
 204. Id. at 78,077. 
 205. See infra notes 120–40 and accompanying text. 
 206. 73 Fed. Reg. at 78,080. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
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advantaged populations would be harmed by the new regulation, focus-
ing instead on the needs of religious healthcare providers and their ob-
jections to certain reproductive health services and rejecting the idea that 
failure to protect contraceptive access in the regulation would actually 
result in diminished access for vulnerable populations.209 
The conscience regulation created a certification requirement that 
also posed a new conditional spending problem.210  Certification require-
ments have been successfully used to prosecute civil False Claims Act211 
cases, which open the door to more whistleblower actions.212  The theory 
is known as a “tainted claim”—even if the healthcare provider has ac-
tually performed the medical care as claimed, if the provider is violating 
a law that is key to the government’s decision regarding reimbursement, 
then the claim can still be deemed false under the terms of the civil False 
Claims Act.213  This possibility extends beyond the intended reach of the 
conscience clause funding statutes, but DHHS expressed no substantive 
response to the concern that a new avenue of False Claims Act cases 
could arise.214 
The conscience regulation is problematic for at least three reasons.  
First, it significantly expanded the laws upon which it built.  Though the 
Danforth Amendment and the Weldon Amendment permit refusal to 
participate in abortion for religious or general moral motivation, abor-
tion and sterilization were the original targets of these Amendments.215  
DHHS drafted the conscience regulation so that it permitted healthcare 
providers to reject other reproductive health services, such as contracep-
tion, with the imprimatur of the federal government, and for reasons that 
are not protected by the First Amendment.  This raises concerns about 
the agency overstepping its legislative mandate, an issue that was briefed 
by the states that challenged the conscience regulation in federal court.216 
 
 209. Id. at 78,080–81. 
 210. 45 C.F.R. § 88.5 (2008). 
 211. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3731 (2006). 
 212. Id. § 3730. 
 213. See United States ex rel. Mikes v. Strauss, 274 F.3d 687, 699–704 (2d Cir. 2001) (delineating 
and adopting the theories of express false certification, implied false certification, and worthless ser-
vices). 
 214. See 73 Fed. Reg. at 78,079 (responding that the agency does not consider the certification to 
be a “material prerequisite” to payment; this will not stop whistleblowers from filing qui tam actions 
under 31 U.S.C. § 3731).  For a discussion of the harmful consequences of broadly accepted whistle-
blower-created causes of action under the False Claims Act, see Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral 
Hazard Problem with Privatization of Public Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 303–39 (2007) (describing the over-litigation that has occurred under the fed-
eral False Claims Act as a result of whistleblowers, particularly with regard to the pharmaceutical in-
dustry). 
 215. See 42 U.S.C. § 238n (2006); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 
§ 508, 118 Stat. 2809, 3163 (2004). 
 216. Connecticut, California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon, and Rhode Island filed 
a lawsuit against DHHS in mid-January.  David Goodhue, States, Groups File Suit to Stop Rule Pro-
tecting Doctors Who Refuse to Perform Abortions, ALL HEADLINE NEWS, Jan. 19, 2009, http://www. 
allheadlinenews.com/articles/7013760235.  In addition, New York is suing DHHS, as are the Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America, the National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Associa-
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Second, federal funding was being wielded in two distinct yet over-
lapping ways that aggrandize the congressional power to spend.  The 
pure funding statutes prohibit key programs such as Medicaid and CHIP 
from paying for most abortions, while the conscience clause funding sta-
tutes encourage healthcare providers to turn women away with no obli-
gation to provide an alternative.217  Even if Medicaid paid for abortions, 
poor women would still face the difficulty of providers being excused 
from performing certain medical services.  Conversely, as was acknowl-
edged in Singleton v. Wulff, when Medicaid does not pay, it is harder for 
a poor woman to find a healthcare provider who will help her pursue her 
medical options because of the conscience clause funding statutes.218  By 
the mechanism of conditions on spending, the federal government ma-
neuvers around Roe and Casey. 
Third, this regulation distended the McRae and Maher precedents 
by prioritizing the conscience-exercising healthcare provider’s rights 
above the woman’s rights, even if the woman is not subject to the condi-
tions attendant to Medicaid enrollment.  In other words, an obstacle ex-
ists in the path of all who seek abortion, sterilization, or contraceptive 
use.  Even if one accepts the flawed precedents of McRae and Maher, 
those cases applied to federal programs that provide medical assistance 
to the poor.  The conscience clause funding statutes and conscience regu-
lation use the federal spending power to narrow access to reproductive 
care for all women, even in private payment situations, because the laws 
affect all healthcare providers who accept federal reimbursement.  Con-
ditions on federal funds thus affect not only individuals who are the ulti-
mate beneficiaries of the conditional funds but also those who are not. 
IV. RECONNECTING SPENDING CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
This Part suggests that either Congress or the Court could effec-
tuate divergence from the current constitutionally questionable path.  
Given the conservative lean of the Court’s current majority, changes 
seem more likely to occur through Congress altering the legacy of Maher 
and McRae via legislative action than through the Court revisiting its 
long-stable precedents. 
 
tion, and the American Civil Liberties Union.  See John Gever, States File Suit to Overturn Healthcare 
Worker ‘Conscience Rule’, MEDPAGE TODAY, Jan. 19, 2009, http://www.medpagetoday.com/ 
PublicHealthPolicy/HealthPolicy/12507. 
 217. See 73 Fed. Reg. at 78,089 (commenter recommended that DHHS create a process for pro-
viders to refer patients to other medical professionals who did not object, but DHHS refused to in-
clude such a requirement in the rule). 
 218. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 117 (1976). 
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A. Legislative Constitutionalism 
Congress was responsible for creating the conditions that lead to the 
benchmark Maher and McRae decisions, and it can remove those condi-
tions as it continues to restructure federal healthcare programs.  Though 
the Court has given Congress the authority to place conditions such as 
the Hyde Amendment on federal spending, Congress need not follow the 
Court’s lead by exercising that given authority.  The ideas described as 
“legislative,”219 “popular,”220 or “political” constitutionalism221 describe 
that the Constitution can and should be interpreted and enforced by the 
legislative branch and that an active polity should look beyond simply re-
lying on adjudication to protect constitutional rights.  In this context, 
Congress could and should cease creating pure funding statutes and con-
science clause funding statutes, or at least modify the most broadly 
worded existing laws, so that the individual is protected and not nego-
tiated out of the federal-state relationship.  The pure funding statutes are 
easily changed, as they are often riders to appropriations bills.  The con-
science clause funding statutes are a bit more complex, as they would re-
quire affirmative legislative action and hard debate.  Though the current 
healthcare reform debate has been highly partisan and the abortion as-
pect of the debate has been high profile, it appears to reflect a casual wil-
lingness to trade women’s reproductive health for a larger cause (rather 
than actual opposition to abortion.)  Though this “trade” is unacceptable 
in many ways, it may indicate that further modifications to the federal 
healthcare schema could include greater attention to women’s health 
needs. 
A model exists for Congress to improve the impact on women of 
federal programs such as Medicaid.  The American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists (ACOG) has issued a series of healthcare 
reform proposals entitled “Health Care for Women Health Care for All” 
that describe in detail the kind of medical coverage that all women 
should be able to receive at all stages of life.222  ACOG describes that all 
women should have insurance coverage for “1) Primary and preventive 
services, including family planning; 2) Pregnancy-related and infant care; 
3) Medically and surgically necessary and appropriate services in all 
health care settings, including outpatient, hospital, nursing facility, hos-
pice, and at-home care; 4) Prescription drugs, and 5) Catastrophic 
care.”223  ACOG’s intent is to describe minimal basic care for all women, 
 
 219. See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five 
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003). 
 220. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
 221. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
 222. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, HEALTH CARE FOR 
WOMEN HEALTH CARE FOR ALL: COVERING SPECIFIC SERVICES IN WOMEN’S HEALTH (2008), 
http://www.acog.org/departments/govtrel/HCFWHCFA-SpecificServices.pdf. 
 223. Id. at 1. 
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regardless of private or public coverage, and it describes exactly the 
kinds of care that all women should receive at each stage of life.  This as-
sessment includes, for instance, preventive care medical evaluations that 
include family planning beginning at age thirteen; pregnancy-related care 
that includes “abortion services, including medical abortion” and sterili-
zation; “medically and surgically necessary and appropriate services” 
that include abortion and sterilization; and prescription drugs that in-
clude contraceptives.224 
The ACOG healthcare reform proposal received some congression-
al attention.  On February 11, 2009, Representative Schakowsky and 
Senator Stabenow presented resolutions in the House and Senate en-
couraging adoption of the ACOG plan.225  The concurrent resolutions 
contain the same language and express the “sense of Congress that na-
tional health care reform should ensure that the health care needs of 
women and of all individuals in the United States are met.”226  The con-
current resolutions were merely hortatory, and though they were timely, 
it now appears that Congress will include Hyde-type language in national 
healthcare reform legislation. 
Admittedly, it seems unlikely that the conscience clause spending 
statutes will be greatly modified by Congress, even though the con-
science regulation has been revisited by the Obama administration.  The 
key would be for Congress to attempt a balance in the conscience clause 
funding statutes, and not just the kind of balance that the Church 
Amendments have wherein the healthcare provider cannot be penalized 
for participating in or refusing to participate in abortion or sterilization 
services.  Though the Church Amendments are more balanced than the 
Weldon and Danforth Amendments, they still fail to protect the individ-
ual impacted by the conditions on spending.  A requirement for referrals 
would help to balance what some see as competing fundamental rights.227 
Congress’s refusal to perpetuate the Hyde-type legislative language 
would go a long way toward erasing the peculiar legacy of Maher and 
McRae.  Though the Democrats in the House and Senate attempted to 
create bills that excluded Hyde-type language, it appears that this legacy 
will carry through in the national health reform under way.  This makes 
the conditional spending authority that facilitated the Hyde Amendment 
even more important to evaluate, as Congress appears to be exacerbating 
the limitations on women’s healthcare. 
 
 224. Id. at 1–4. 
 225. S. Con. Res. 6, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. Con. Res. 48, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 226. See S. Con. Res. 6; H.R. Con. Res. 48. 
 227. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 188, at 59 (proposing that such a balance can be achieved at the 
state level). 
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B. Judicial Constitutionalism 
Compared to other Congressional powers, the Spending Clause has 
been interpreted relatively infrequently.  Though the Court determined 
in 1936 that the spending power was a stand-alone enumerated congres-
sional power,228 the Court did not delineate the test for evaluating when 
conditions placed on federal funds will be deemed constitutional until 
1987 in South Dakota v. Dole.229  South Dakota challenged a minimum 
drinking age requirement attached to federal highway funding, claiming 
the condition was unconstitutional.230  Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected 
this argument by setting forth and applying what is now the five-part test 
for determining the constitutionality of conditions on federal spending.231  
The Dole decision focused on the federal-state relationship and essential-
ly allowed the federal government to regulate states indirectly through 
conditional spending in ways that it might not be able to do directly.232  
This narrow focus on the federal-state relationship is challenging because 
programs like Medicaid and CHIP are not just programs that command 
state compliance with federal law, they are also intended to benefit par-
ticular individuals by creating a federal scheme that is to be followed and 
administered by the states.  The Dole test fails to account for the individ-
ual beneficiary of the federal scheme. 
1. (Re)Applying the Dole Test—General Welfare 
The first element of the Dole test demands that the federal govern-
ment spend only for the “general welfare,” which originates from the 
language of Article I.233  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that courts should 
defer to the judgment of Congress rather than second guess whether the 
spending is actually for the general welfare.234  As a whole, the Medicaid 
Act can be described as providing for the general welfare.  Congress has 
decided to provide healthcare services to people who would not other-
wise be able to access them due to low income status (albeit not all such 
people).235 
 
 228. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 85 (1936). 
 229. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). 
 230. Id. at 205. 
 231. Id. at 207–08. 
 232. See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 
1914 (1995). 
 233. The Spending Clause provides: “The Congress shall have Power . . . to pay the Debts and 
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 1; Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
 234. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.  The Eighth Circuit’s decision below added additional clarification that 
was not adopted by Rehnquist’s majority opinion (which otherwise tracks the appellate court’s deci-
sion in many ways).  That court noted that general welfare means “the well-being of the nation as a 
whole” rather than a “particular region or locality.”  South Dakota v. Dole, 791 F.2d 628, 631 (8th Cir. 
1986). 
 235. 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2006). 
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But part of the inquiry should be which aspect of the spending pro-
gram is at issue in determining spending for the general welfare: is it Me-
dicaid as a whole program, or is it the list of limits placed on use of Medi-
caid funds by the Hyde Amendment?  This is as tricky as framing 
questions of injury for standing, because the characterization determines 
the outcome.  If the spending activity is narrowed to placing limits on use 
of federal funds to prevent paying for abortion, the benefit for the gener-
al welfare is muddied; forcing poor women to birth children, or to forgo 
life necessities to seek a safe abortion, do not appear to be outcomes that 
serve the general welfare.  Nevertheless, the Court has essentially ren-
dered this element of the Dole test a political question, and scholarly ob-
servers consider the general welfare requirement to be so much surplu-
sage.236  The remaining four elements of the Dole test are not all actively 
enforced, but neither are they considered to be political questions. 
2. Clear Conditions 
The Dole test next asks whether the federal government has pro-
vided unambiguous notice of conditions on spending, a standard that was 
narrowed by the 2006 Roberts Court decision in Arlington Central 
School District Board of Education v. Murphy, which demands “clear” 
notice.237  According to Arlington, this means the Court must ask whether 
“a state official who is engaged in the process of deciding whether the 
State should accept . . . funds and the obligations that go with those 
funds. . . . would clearly understand . . . the obligations of the Act . . . . In 
other words, we must ask whether the [act] furnishes clear notice.”238   
As an example for the pure funding statute model, consider the 
Medicaid Act, a more than forty-year-old law that Congress has modified 
yearly if not more frequently.239  It is difficult to analyze whether the Me-
dicaid Act provides state officials with clear notice given the ever-
changing nature of the program and the long-term state reliance on Me-
dicaid funding.240  The Hyde Amendment would seem to defy the notion 
that a constantly amended statutory scheme cannot be clear; however, it 
is also technically not a part of the Medicaid Act.  It is part of the yearly 
appropriations bill that facilitates the ongoing funding of the Medicaid 
program.  This pure funding statute does not contain the limitation on 
abortion services; instead, the condition on spending is placed on DHHS, 
 
 236. See, e.g., Baker & Berman, supra note 35, at 464 (describing the general welfare prong as a 
“complete throwaway”). 
 237. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006); Dole, 483 U.S. 
at 207. 
 238. Arlington, 548 U.S. at 296. 
 239. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396v. 
 240. See Nicole Huberfeld, Clear Notice for Conditions on Spending, Unclear Implications for 
States in Federal Healthcare Programs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 441, 488 (2008) (describing the changing nature 
of programs like Medicare and Medicaid and questioning the utility of clear statement rules for such 
long-standing programs). 
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which passes the condition on to the states, most of which then choose to 
pass the limitation on to Medicaid enrollees.  Acknowledging this tech-
nical linkage, the Hyde Amendment and other pure funding statutes re-
quire that no funds may be used for abortion except to save the life of 
the mother, or sometimes in instances of rape or incest.241  For purposes 
of the Dole test, this does not appear to be ambiguous language. 
The Dole analysis ends there, which is at least part of the conun-
drum.  The state accepts certain federal conditions knowing that they are 
(or may be) unconstitutional as a quid pro quo for much needed federal 
funds.242  The stance of the Court has long been that the federal govern-
ment may do indirectly through spending what it may not do directly 
through other Article I powers.243  But the clear notice prong of the Dole 
test only asks if the state understands the conditions on spending and 
does not question the constitutionality of the condition or the impact on 
spending beneficiaries.  The fourth Dole prong, unconstitutional condi-
tions, focuses on the party directly affected by the spending.  But if the 
state and the federal government are complicit in violating a constitu-
tional right by means of conditional spending, it is nonsensical to simply 
confirm that the condition is “clear.”244 
Stated differently, the exercise of this particular right is much like 
the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel,245 in that it requires 
the assistance of a professional, a physician.  Denial of payment to the 
healthcare provider is denial of the right itself, whether or not the condi-
tion of that funding is clear to the state accepting the federal funds.246  
Both the healthcare provider and the Medicaid enrollee are affected by 
the state’s decision to accept the condition on spending but unaccounted 
for in the clear statement rule.  Jurists, such as Justice Scalia, who believe 
that third-party beneficiaries of federal spending have no right to sue to 
enforce benefits may also be likely to assert that the impact on the indi-
vidual is an unnecessary inquiry.247  That response would be misleading, 
 
 241. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397ee(c)(1), 1397jj(a)(16). 
 242. States will readily admit that rejecting federal Medicaid funds because of questionable condi-
tions attached to the spending is not an option.  For an unsuccessful attempt at arguing this amounts to 
coercion by the federal government, see West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 289 
F.3d 281, 297 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 243. South Dakota v. Dole 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).  Justice Rehnquist wrote: “[O]bjectives not 
thought to be within Article I’s ‘enumerated legislative fields,’ may nevertheless be attained through 
the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 244. See Tribe, supra note 104, at 333 (“[F]ailure to provide the needed aid at public expense 
amounts to forced alienation of the underlying right.”). 
 245. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002) (finding a fundamental right to appointment of 
counsel in misdemeanor cases where defendant is sentenced to a suspended period of incarceration); 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (finding a fundamental right to appointment of counsel in 
serious criminal cases). 
 246. See Kenneth Agran, When Government Must Pay: Compensating Rights and the Constitution, 
22 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 101–02 (2005) (describing a line of decisions requiring the government to 
pay to facilitate “equal access” for indigent citizens including civil and criminal litigation). 
 247. Certain Justices believe that beneficiaries of federal spending should not be able to sue to 
enforce rights to their benefits through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because third-party beneficiaries could not 
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though, as conditional spending affects not just the state but also the in-
dividual who ultimately receives the benefit of the federal spending.  One 
counter-argument might then be that the federal government could 
choose not to spend, leaving the beneficiary in a worse situation (the 
“greater includes the lesser” position).  Perhaps, but in the instance of 
both pure funding statutes and conscience clause funding statutes, the 
federal government already has chosen to spend and is using that deci-
sion to manipulate providers and beneficiaries of federal healthcare pro-
grams. 
The clear notice requirement is also inadequate in the conscience 
clause funding statute context.  The Dole test demands that a state have 
clear notice, but again, states are not the only parties that accept federal 
funds.  A hospital, for example, chooses to accept federal funds when it 
participates in Medicaid and accepts the conditions attached thereto.  
One of those conditions is the conscience clause funding statutes.  The 
clear notice requirement of the Dole test does not protect the hospital, as 
it focuses on a state’s acceptance of conditions on federal funds.  Further, 
it does not protect individuals who seek treatment in the hospital and 
who have no control over the conditions on federal spending that may 
affect their care.248 
3. Reasonably Related 
The third Dole requirement is that “conditions on federal grants 
might be illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to the federal interest in par-
ticular national projects or programs.’”249  The Rehnquist majority did 
not consider the “germaneness” element a serious concern for South 
Dakota and therefore did not elaborate on its boundaries, but Justice 
O’Connor’s brief dissent would have given this prong some teeth.250  Jus-
tice O’Connor wrote: 
There is a clear place at which the Court can draw the line between 
permissible and impermissible conditions on federal grants. “Con-
 
sue at the time § 1983 was passed, perhaps revealing a larger attitude regarding legal entitlements and 
the individuals who benefit from such programs.  See Huberfeld, supra note 37, at 433 n.103. 
 248. The conscience regulation may create a conflict with another federal law, the Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), which requires all hospitals that accept Medi-
care as reimbursement and that have emergency departments to screen and treat, or properly transfer, 
all patients that present in the emergency department.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006).  If a woman is 
raped and present in the emergency department, the hospital has an obligation to treat her, for which 
the standard treatment may include providing her with the morning after pill (a drug that prevents 
conception and that is not an abortifacient).  If a healthcare provider working in the emergency de-
partment refuses to provide the morning after pill (and will not refer the patient to another healthcare 
professional who is willing to supply the drug), then the hospital would be violating its duties under 
EMTALA and would potentially be civilly liable to the patient and to the federal government for vi-
olations of that statute.  Though this issue was raised by a commenter to the conscience regulation, 
DHHS dismissed it summarily.  See 73 Fed. Reg. 78,087 (Dec. 19, 2008). 
 249. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citing Massachusetts v. United States, 435 
U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion)). 
 250. See id. at 212–18 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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gress has the power to spend for the general welfare, it has the 
power to legislate only for delegated purposes.  The appropriate in-
quiry, then, is whether the spending requirement or prohibition is a 
condition on a grant or whether it is regulation.”251 
Justice O’Connor’s distinction draws on the notion from Butler that the 
power to spend is not limited to supporting the enumerated powers of 
Congress in Article I, but it also does not empower Congress to regulate 
in ways that otherwise would be prohibited.252  This analysis would then 
ask whether Congress can prohibit poor women from accessing abortion 
as a condition of Medicaid enrollment (which Representative Hyde 
stated was the intent of the Hyde Amendment); the answer would be no.   
This does not capture the whole predicament, though, as some of 
the pure funding statutes are worded so as to directly address the way in 
which funds should be spent, also part of Justice O’Connor’s dissent in 
Dole.253  Thus, the germaneness analysis must be about more than simply 
how funds should be spent.  For example, the Hyde Amendment is not 
germane for a second reason.  The federal government spends Medicaid 
dollars to enable “each State . . . to furnish medical assistance on behalf 
of families with dependent children . . . whose income and resources are 
insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services . . . .”254  Thus, 
the Medicaid Act facilitates provision of medical care to the indigent, but 
the Hyde Amendment deliberately withholds care to the indigent.  The 
national statistics are well known: nearly half of all pregnancies in the 
United States are unintended, a third of all women aged twenty to twen-
ty-four will terminate a pregnancy, and more than a fifth of all women 
will have an abortion by the end of their reproductive years.255  Abortion 
is one of the most commonly performed medical procedures in the Unit-
ed States,256 and it requires the assistance of a medical professional to 
safely perform the procedure either by medication or surgery.257  Pure 
funding statutes such as the Hyde Amendment fail the germaneness test 
by denying to women legal, nonexperimental, and medically necessary 
assistance—a direct conflict with the goal of the Medicaid Act.258  The 
 
 251. Id. at 215–16 (quoting Brief of the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (No. 86-260), 1987 WL 
880310). 
 252. See id. at 216–17. 
 253. See id. at 215. 
 254. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006). 
 255. See GUTTMACHER INST., FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION IN AMERICA 1 (2008), http://www. 
guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.pdf. 
 256. Rachel K. Jones et al., Abortion in the United States: Incidence and Access to Services, 2005, 
40 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6, 6 (2008). 
 257. See NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, SAFETY OF ABORTION 2 (2006), http://www.prochoice.org/ 
pubs_research/publications/downloads/about_abortion/safety_of_abortion.pdf. 
 258. If the goal is to treat as many as possible with minimal federal funds through Medicaid, the 
Hyde Amendment achieves the opposite result, as abortion is much cheaper than pregnancy and child 
care.  A number of legislators raised this point during the extensive debates over the Hyde Amend-
ment when it was first passed, but Representative Hyde and other anti-abortion legislators likened this 
argument to Nazi eugenic policies.  See 123 CONG. REC. 19,703–04 (1977).  They failed to support the 
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privacy right protected by Roe, Casey, and (perhaps) Gonzales v. Carhart 
need not be raised to come to this conclusion.  Quite simply, refusal to 
fund a common, necessary medical procedure for a certain portion of the 
population is not rationally related to funding medical assistance for that 
portion of the population.259 
The reasonable relationship is more attenuated with the conscience 
clause funding statutes.  The Dole majority held that “Congress condi-
tioned the receipt of federal funds in a way reasonably calculated to ad-
dress this particular impediment to a purpose for which the funds are ex-
pended,” a relatively easy level of review to pass.260  Yet, this standard for 
analysis is flawed; for example, the Danforth Amendment is attached to 
Title X, an act that is intended to facilitate creation of “family planning 
facilities.”261  It stretches the bounds of reason to consider the condition 
to that act allowing healthcare providers to opt out of abortion, steriliza-
tion, and contraception to be a condition that is “reasonably calculated” 
to furthering the congressional goal of providing family planning.  But 
this is what the conscience clause funding statutes do; they attach condi-
tions to spending that are anathema to the goal of the spending itself.   
Further, the conscience clause funding statutes attach conditions in 
such a way that individuals who are not beneficiaries of federal spending 
are also subject to their limitations.  All patients in a hospital, regardless 
of whether they rely on public or private insurance mechanisms, are sub-
ject to the rules that protect healthcare providers who refuse to partici-
pate in abortion or sterilization.262  The condition protects those with 
moral objections, not just religious objections, and allows everyone in the 
hospital to refuse to participate, including those who have no direct pa-
tient contact.  This has the potential to disrupt the work of the hospital, 
and the treatment of all patients, regardless of the insurance source.  The 
Court’s failure to apply germaneness has facilitated this tenuous connec-
tion between the condition and the federal funding.263 
4. Unconstitutional Conditions 
The fourth prong of the Dole test states that “other constitutional 
provisions may provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of 
federal funds.”264  Chief Justice Rehnquist clarified this element by stat-
 
programs necessary to support women and children once the pregnancy came to term, a concern also 
raised by legislators during the debates.  See id. at 19,709. 
 259. Amicus briefs urged the Court in Dole to “establish that a condition on federal funds is legi-
timate only if it relates directly to the purpose of the expenditure to which it is attached” but the Court 
declined, reasoning that the petitioners had not requested such an interpretation and that the issues in 
the case did not require such restrictive language.  South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 n.3 (1987). 
 260. Id. at 209. 
 261. 42 U.S.C. § 300 (2006).   
 262. See supra text accompanying notes 182–84. 
 263. See Baker & Berman, supra note 35, at 465–66. 
 264. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. 
HUBERFELD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2010  10:32 AM 
790 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2010 
ing that the spending power cannot be used “to induce the States to en-
gage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional.”265  The ma-
jority used the example that the federal government could not condition 
receipt of federal funds on the state inflicting cruel and unusual punish-
ment or on the state engaging in violations of the Equal Protection 
Clause.266  The Court found that the Twenty-First Amendment did not 
pose an independent constitutional bar to the condition on highway 
funding.267  The majority simply held that the state was induced to enact a 
higher drinking age than it might have otherwise, which did not violate 
the reservation of power to the states in either the Twenty-First or the 
Tenth Amendments.268  The Court’s articulation of the fourth prong does 
not necessarily lead to this result, but the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine is unpredictable.  Indeed, many scholars have observed that the 
Court applies the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions unevenly, and 
the outcome seemingly depends on the right at stake rather than a con-
sistent application of the law.269   
Dole’s description of the independent constitutional bar would seem 
to reverse McRae and Maher, as they permitted the federal government 
to impose conditions on federal funds that require the state to either pay 
for reproductive services without a federal match or require that women 
who want Medicaid assistance waive their right to access abortion.270  The 
former is not necessarily the imposition of an independent constitutional 
bar, but it does implicate coercion, discussed in the next Section.  The lat-
ter does implicate an independent constitutional bar, but McRae and 
Maher have not been overruled, the result of which is the many pure 
funding statutes and conscience clause funding statutes discussed herein.   
The Dole read of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine focuses 
solely on the relationship between the federal government, the condition, 
and the state.  As this Article has observed, that standard analysis does 
not account for all parties to the transaction.  Admittedly, the Court has 
chipped away at the Roe precedent in such a way that its analysis has 
been twisted into a different kind of fundamental right.271  Nevertheless, 
 
 265. Id. at 210. 
 266. See id. at 210–11. 
 267. Id. at 209–11. 
 268. Id. at 211–12. 
 269. A number of legal academic luminaries have attempted to make sense of the unconstitution-
al conditions doctrine, which Professor Farber recently called a “doctrinal swamp.”  See Daniel A. 
Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 913, 914 (2006).  See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitu-
tional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1 (2001); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 
1987 Term Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. 
L. REV. 4 (1988); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive 
State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. 
L. REV. 1413 (1989). 
 270. Harris v. McRae, 488 U.S. 297, 326 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1976). 
 271. Typically, if the government wants to inhibit the exercise of a fundamental right, it must have 
a compelling reason for doing so and that reason must be narrowly tailored to the compelling govern-
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the precedents still stand, and yet Congress has bypassed them by paying 
for medical assistance in every other situation in which medical care is 
necessary, including childbirth, except this one. 
5. Compulsion 
The Dole test contains a fifth element, which states that at some 
point congressional coercion becomes impermissible compulsion.272  The 
Court’s brief analysis indicated that this prong is, at least in part, about 
the amount of money at stake.  In Dole, states would lose five percent of 
the offered federal highway funds if they refused to comply with the 
drinking age condition; the Court did not deem this potential loss of 
funds to be “compulsion.”273  This is another element of the Dole test that 
has been little interpreted and, as a result, few lower federal courts have 
been willing to apply the compulsion prong (often referred to as “coer-
cion”).274 
Even so, the Dole Court appeared to find relevant the amount of 
federal funding provided and jeopardized for noncompliance; in that 
vein, consider the monetary aspect of the pure funding statutes.  States 
rely very heavily on Medicaid funding, which promises a federal match 
(known as the FMAP) ranging from fifty percent to eighty-three per-
cent.275  The more a state chooses to spend on its “deserving poor,” the 
more the federal government must pay to match that state’s expendi-
tures.276  Every state has participated in Medicaid since the early 1970s, 
and many of the poorest states are the richest recipients of federal Medi-
caid funds.277  For example, Mississippi had the lowest median household 
income in 2007.278  The most recent year for which complete data are 
available shows that in fiscal year 2006, Mississippi’s federal match was 
 
mental interest.  This strict scrutiny test was applied in Roe, at least pre-viability.  See Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 155, 163 (1973).  In Casey, however, the level of scrutiny was lowered to an “undue bur-
den” analysis, a standard that had been at least mentioned in other abortion-related cases but that had 
not been applied to fundamental rights.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
874, 877–78 (1992).  The undue burden standard appears to have been further eroded by Gonzales v. 
Carhart, in which Justice Kennedy applied a hybrid undue burden/rational basis review to the federal 
Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.  See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167–68 (2007). 
 272. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.  As stated by the majority: “[I]n some circumstances the financial in-
ducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into 
compulsion.’”  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 273. Id. at 211–12. 
 274. See, e.g., West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 291–92 (4th 
Cir. 2002).  For discussion of this case and its elaboration on the compulsion idea, see Huberfeld, supra 
note 240, at 458–62. 
 275. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b) (2006) (delineating the formula for the Federal Medical Assistance 
Percentage, or FMAP, which determines the rate at which the federal government will match state 
funds).   
 276. See id. 
 277. See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 20, at 60–61. 
 278. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Household Income Rises, Poverty Rate Unchanged, 
Number of Uninsured Down (Aug. 26, 2008), http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/ 
archives/income_wealth/012528.html. 
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seventy-six percent; the state received $3.17 for every dollar it spent on 
Medicaid (yet it still spent only $4144 per enrollee, lower than the na-
tional average of $4575).279  In 2002, over half of all births in Mississippi 
were covered by Medicaid.280  Compare Mississippi to New York, one of 
the wealthier states, which had an FMAP of fifty percent in 2006 and still 
spends significantly more per beneficiary ($7927), and covers abortion 
beyond the confines of the Hyde Amendment.281 
Given the degree to which poor states rely on Medicaid funding, it 
appears that federal compulsion could be present.  Though the Hyde 
Amendment does not directly force states to choose between accepting 
Medicaid funding and paying for abortion, most states only pay for the 
limited abortion services that are permitted by the Hyde Amendment.282  
The examples of Mississippi and New York illustrates that the states that 
have chosen to pay for abortions beyond the Hyde Amendment are also 
states that have a lower FMAP, indicating that they can afford to pay for 
more medical assistance for their poor.  The poorest states tend not to 
pay for more than Medicaid will cover, but given the statistics regarding 
who relies the most heavily on Medicaid for pregnancy care and who 
seeks abortion services, it seems that women in these states also need 
Medicaid’s assistance the most.283  It is difficult to say if most states are 
choosing not to fund beyond the scope of the Hyde Amendment because 
of funding, ideology, both, or neither; however, before the Hyde 
Amendment, all states funded abortion under the requirements of the 
Medicaid Act, and after the Hyde Amendment only seventeen states 
provide funding beyond its strictures.284 
States have participated in Medicaid for more than forty years, and 
choosing to reject Medicaid funds based on certain conditions seems im-
probable, especially knowing that states could not otherwise shoulder the 
burden of their low-income and chronically ill patients and that their 
healthcare systems would likely collapse.285  Though federal courts have 
 
 279. Kaiser Family Foundation, Mississippi: Federal Matching Rate (FMAP) for Medicaid and 
Multiplier, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?ind=184&cat=4&rgn=26 (last visited Feb. 15, 
2010); Kaiser Family Foundation, Mississippi: Medicaid Payments per Enrollee, FY2006, http://www. 
statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?ind=183&cat=4&rgn=26 (last visited Feb. 15, 2010). 
 280. MEDICAID’S ROLE FOR WOMEN, supra note 115.  
 281. Kaiser Family Foundation, New York: Federal Matching Rate (FMAP) for Medicaid and 
Multiplier, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?ind=184&cat=4&rgn=34 (last visited Feb. 15, 
2010); Kaiser Family Foundation, New York: Medicaid Payments per Enrollee, FY2006, http://www. 
statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?ind=183&cat=4&rgn=34 (last visited Feb. 15, 2010). 
 282. NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, PUBLIC FUNDING FOR ABORTION: MEDICAID AND THE HYDE 
AMENDMENT 2 (2006), http://www.prochoice.org/pubs_research/publications/downloads/about_ 
abortion/public_funding.pdf. 
 283. MEDICAID’S ROLE FOR WOMEN, supra note 120 (noting that abortion rates are higher 
among low-income women and have been increasing since 1994, and that the procedure is becoming 
increasingly concentrated among poor women, including those on Medicaid). 
 284. See supra notes 58–67 and accompanying text.  See also ABORTION IN THE U.S., supra note 
133. 
 285. See Rosenbaum, supra note 6, at 6, 27–30 (explaining that the nation and the states cannot 
survive without Medicaid but that states also resent the financial burden it represents in their budgets). 
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often emphasized that states can refuse Medicaid funds if they dislike the 
conditions imposed on them,286 this response is unrealistic; no matter how 
burdensome the condition, states have not ceased their Medicaid partici-
pation.287  Likewise, poor individuals have the choice of being uninsured, 
a sure barrier to medical care, or being enrolled in Medicaid (assuming 
they meet the categorical and financial eligibility requirements).288  The 
Court in McRae and Maher indicated a belief that women could still 
access those services that the government refused to fund through Medi-
caid, but it is an illusion of choice given that Medicaid beneficiaries are 
extraordinarily poor and rely on Medicaid for all of their medical assis-
tance.289  Justice Blackmun recognized this fact in Singleton v. Wulff290 
and Justice Brennan so noted in his dissent in Maher,291 and it is as true 
today as it was thirty years ago.  Such realities make the idea of coercion 
more concrete. 
The conscience clause funding statutes further the possibility held 
within the idea of coercion.  These statutes are tied to federal funding but 
primarily for privately run healthcare programs, not state programs,292 
and they help to highlight the missing piece in conditional spending.  For 
example, Title X grant recipients create and maintain family planning 
clinics.293  They tend to be local government actors and are more often 
nonprofit organizations.294  The Danforth Amendment prevents them 
from counseling abortion as a form of family planning, and this restric-
tion must be accepted to continue to receive Title X funding.295  Once an 
entity has accepted Title X funding, it would be extremely difficult to 
 
 286. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987). 
 287. Consider, for instance, the Clawback provision in Medicare Part D, which requires states to 
pay the federal government for the drug costs faced by dual eligibles (people enrolled in both Medi-
care and Medicaid).  Though this appears to be an impermissible condition on spending and perhaps 
an impermissible intergovernmental tax, no state has dropped their Medicaid State Plan.  See Huber-
feld, supra note 232, at 486–91 (discussing the constitutionality of the Clawback provision). 
 288. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, U.S. Department of Health & Human Services., 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/home/medicaid.asp (follow “Medicaid Eligibility” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 
15, 2010). 
 289. See supra notes 46–47, 67 and accompanying text. 
 290. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 117 (1976) (“A woman cannot safely secure an abortion 
without the aid of a physician, and an impecunious woman cannot easily secure an abortion without 
the physician’s being paid by the State.”). 
 291. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 464, 485–86 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  The Court’s con-
struction can only result as a practical matter in forcing penniless pregnant women to have children 
they would not have borne if the State had not weighted the scales to make their choice to have abor-
tions substantially more onerous: “For a doctor who cannot afford to work for nothing, and a woman 
who cannot afford to pay him, the State’s refusal to fund an abortion is as effective an ‘interdiction’ of 
it as would ever be necessary.”  Id. (quoting Singleton, 428 U.S. at 118–19 n.7). 
 292. CHRISTINA FOWLER, JULIA GABLE & JIANTONG WANG, RTI INT’L FAMILY PLANNING 
ANNUAL REPORT: 2007 NAT’L SUMMARY 7 (2008) (showing that fifty-five percent of Title X grants 
were awarded to state and local health departments, while the remaining forty-five percent were di-
vided between nonprofit family planning agencies, independent clinics, and community health agen-
cies); SONFIELD ET AL., supra note 134, at 9. 
 293. 42 U.S.C. § 300 (2006). 
 294. SONFIELD ET AL., supra note 134, at 9. 
 295. See Wilson, supra note 188, at 49. 
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forgo that funding without shutting down.  The Court’s coercion analysis 
involves the state, an actor that has more bargaining power with the fed-
eral government than most others have.296  The assumption that the party 
accepting the conditions on spending can simply choose to reject the 
conditions seems erroneous when the power imbalance between com-
munity nonprofit and federal government is considered. 
Applied with teeth, the Dole test reveals that both the pure funding 
statutes and the conscience clause funding statutes are impermissible ex-
ercises of the federal power to spend.  The Court has read the power to 
spend broadly, but it has created a test that facilitates stronger scrutiny.  
Given that the Roberts Court has been willing to revisit precedent but 
has taken incremental steps in the area of the Spending Clause, perhaps 
the Dole test is worth another look.297 
C. Conditions and the Individual—Finding a Framework 
The Rehnquist Court was interested in limiting congressional pow-
er, yet paradoxically the Court avoided narrowing its interpretation of 
the Spending Clause, thereby allowing Congress to circumvent constitu-
tional rules by imposing conditions on spending.298  This leniency seems 
inconsistent with the Rehnquist Court’s revitalization of federalism and 
limitations on Commerce Clause power,299 though it is consistent with the 
“greater includes the lesser” theory of conditional spending.300  Court 
watchers predicted that the Spending Clause would be the next front in 
the federalism revolution, but if that was Chief Justice Rehnquist’s in-
tent, it was unfinished business.301 
In reality, the Court has not addressed the contours of congressional 
power under the Spending Clause often.  With limited jurisprudence to 
mine, determining the boundaries of the power to spend and to place 
conditions on the receipt of funds becomes a bit of an exercise in clair-
voyance.  Nevertheless, given the Roberts Court’s pattern of revisiting 
precedent, and the fact that the Court has slightly modified the standards 
for conditions on spending, this Section endeavors to determine how im-
pact on individuals can be reflected better in the conditional spending 
 
 296. See supra note 284 and accompanying text. 
 297. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345, 
352 (2008).  See generally Baker & Berman, supra note 35, at 485 (arguing that although the Dole test 
has been “toothless,” it should not be completely abandoned). 
 298. See Baker, supra note 224, at 1988–89 (explaining how the Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
of the Rehnquist Court could coexist with the Spending Clause jurisprudence of the Court). 
 299. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608, 617–19 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 924 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995); New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 218 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 300. See Baker, supra note 232, at 1915 n.13. 
 301. See David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A Function-
al Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197, 
1198–99 (2004) (arguing that the expansive Spending Clause power was minimally impacted by the 
Rehnquist Court’s federalism revolution). 
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analysis.  The Roberts Court thus far has limited individual rights and 
read statutory language narrowly,302 admittedly a tricky combination for 
contemplating how conditions on spending can be evaluated with an eye 
toward protecting individuals. 
Tension exists between Dole’s focus on the federal-state relation-
ship and the reality that federal conditions on spending impact more than 
just the states.  Individuals too are subjected to conditions on spending, 
which was not directly at issue in Dole.303  The only canon that appears to 
cover the federal government-individual relationship is the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine, which is incoherent.304  This doctrine 
represents the Court’s analysis of the federal government’s ability to in-
fluence individual behavior through “spending, licensing, and employ-
ment.”305  In other words, “government may not condition the receipt of 
its benefits upon the nonassertion of constitutional rights even if receipt 
of such benefits is . . . a ‘mere privilege.’”306  The doctrine has been ap-
plied inconsistently, sometimes protecting fundamental rights and indi-
vidual liberties, and sometimes not, though the basic idea is that an indi-
vidual can litigate governmental action that “indirectly inhibits or 
penalizes the exercise of constitutional rights.”307  Serious scholarly at-
tempts to reconcile the inconsistencies in unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine have been made, but none has dominated the discourse and the 
Court continues to be unpredictable in application of the doctrine.308   
Further, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is an 
uncomfortable fit for both the pure funding statutes and the conscience 
clause funding statutes because of the various levels at which the funding 
and attendant conditions operate.  At the first level, the pure funding 
statutes reflect federalism; the state can accept or reject the funding 
depending on whether the elements of the Dole test are met, most 
importantly (to the Court) the clear notice requirement.309  But a second 
level exists beyond the state acceptance of federal funds.  This is the level 
at which the individual who relies on the federal spending program has 
 
 302. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 2d 423, 424 (2007).  
Professor Chemerinsky observed: 
What does it mean that the Court was more conservative? . . . The Court moved significantly to 
the right on key issues that divide liberals and conservatives—in particular, abortion and race. 
The Court tended to favor the government over individuals across a wide range of issues.  And 
the Court tended to favor businesses over employees and consumers.” 
Id.  
 303. The state challenged federal legislation, and individuals did not join the state.  Thus, the only 
element of the Dole analysis that incorporated individuals (if any) was the idea of spending for the 
general welfare, which is nonjusticiable.  See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
 304. See Farber, supra note 269, at 914, 926–31 (surveying the caselaw and the literature regarding 
unconstitutional conditions and noting that it is a “swamp”).  
 305. Sunstein, supra note 32, at 593–94. 
 306. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-8, 681 (2d ed. 1988). 
 307. Id. 
 308. See id.; see also supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
 309. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006); South Da-
kota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). 
HUBERFELD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2010  10:32 AM 
796 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2010 
the conditions imposed that were accepted by the state or other 
intermediary.  This second level is unrepresented in either the Dole 
analysis or the traditional unconstitutional conditions analysis.  In the 
first, only the federal-state relationship is discussed.  In the second, the 
Court assumes a direct bargaining relationship between the federal 
government and the individual that tends not to be present. 
Consider again the Medicaid program.  Its legal entitlement extends 
to both the state and the individual enrollee.  So long as the state adheres 
to its State Plan, the federal government must continue to provide 
matching funds, but those funds come with certain conditions.  Many of 
those conditions operate on the state; in other words, they require the 
state to adhere to certain rules regarding the administration of the pro-
gram, such as comparability.310  But many of those conditions also benefit 
or burden the state’s Medicaid enrollees, who have no part in the crea-
tion of the State Plan or the state’s acceptance of the federal conditions, 
as well as the healthcare providers who agree to treat enrollees.311  Thus, 
though the Court undertook an unconstitutional conditions analysis in 
McRae and Maher (albeit a flawed one), it failed to account for the na-
ture of the conditional spending. 
Other pure funding statutes contain similar features: the federal 
government bargains with an intermediary (i.e., the state, a clinic) that 
may not represent the individual beneficiary well enough to consider ac-
ceptance of the condition a true waiver of constitutional rights.312  The 
conscience clause funding statutes magnify the issue; in exchange for 
federal funding of any kind, healthcare providers must permit unspeci-
fied moral objections to reproductive health services.  Both models per-
mit indirect violation of constitutional rights, particularly women’s re-
productive rights, and the incursions are deliberate.  The question then is 
how to connect the Spending Clause jurisprudence to the individual so 
that such intentional, yet indirect, attacks by use of conditioned federal 
funds are at least recognized if not prevented. 
One avenue would be to apply the existing Dole framework to the 
individual, not just the state; if the Court were to apply the Dole test in 
such a way that it is conjunctive (rather than selective), it may analyze 
fully conditional spending.  The analysis in the prior Section of this Ar-
ticle indicates that Dole may be up to the task.313  This would require the 
Court to scrutinize germaneness and coercion, which has occurred on 
rare occasion.  For instance, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 
decided in the same term as Dole, the Court considered conditions 
 
 310. See supra note 114–15 and accompanying text. 
 311. Professor Farber refers to this as “third-party effects,” meaning that the government bar-
gains with an intermediary who may or may not actually represent the interests of the individual 
whose constitutional rights are at issue.  See Farber, supra note 269, at 935. 
 312. As Professor Farber observed, the Court has allowed many constitutional rights to become 
“alienable.”  Id. at 917–26. 
 313. See supra Part IV.B. 
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placed on landowners who wanted to build a home that would block pub-
lic beach access.314  Though a property case, Justice Scalia’s majority ana-
lyzed the state’s imposition of the condition (an easement) using a ger-
maneness analysis.  The Court held that, because the condition was 
required for obtaining the necessary building and land use permits, the 
state was able to “extort” the easement out of the property owner with-
out paying for the taking of the property; and further the permit condi-
tion did not serve the same governmental purpose as the development 
ban, thereby eliminating any nexus between the ban and the condition.315  
In other words, germaneness did not exist because the condition was not 
tailored closely enough to the goal of the law.  Some have said that ger-
maneness is unsuited to judicial decision making,316 but the Court often 
determines whether or not a law is properly tailored to the governmental 
goal, especially when the government infringes individual rights in pur-
suit of that goal.  That the spending power should be exempt from this 
kind of nexus analysis is unpersuasive. 
Likewise, some have asserted that coercion is not judicially deter-
minable, but even Dole seems to indicate otherwise, as Chief Justice 
Rehnquist indicated that some degree of proportionality should be con-
sidered.317  South Dakota only jeopardized five percent of the offered 
federal highway funding if it refused to change the drinking age, and that 
was not enough to reach the point where “coercion becomes compul-
sion” because the state would still receive a significant proportion of the 
offered federal funds if the condition were rejected.318  On the other 
hand, in the case of Medicaid, Title X, and CHIP, failure to comply with 
conditions can result in complete withdrawal of funding.319  States have 
asserted that they cannot reject federal conditions; imagine then the posi-
tion of the Medicaid enrollee.  Only the poorest and most vulnerable cit-
izens even qualify for Medicaid funding.  The idea that they could nego-
tiate with the federal government regarding conditions on federal funds 
verges on the absurd.320 
 
 314. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987). 
 315. Id. at 837. 
 316. Id. at 846 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 317. See Farber, supra note 269, at 946.  Farber goes on to discount this interpretation as unwork-
able because, in his contract analogy, this is about pricing, and the courts are not in the business of 
ensuring fair pricing.  Id. at 948.   
 318. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).  
 319. Given the technical structure of the Hyde Amendment, a state would have to seek reim-
bursement from Medicaid for something other than abortion and then redirect the funds for that pur-
pose, which sounds like it could be too much effort, but it has occurred in hospital financing schemes.  
See Huberfeld, supra note 37, at 466.  Of course, this would also create a potential violation of the 
False Claims Act.  31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006). 
 320. The absurdity is highlighted by Professor Ruth Colker in relaying the facts from Doe v. Mah-
er, a Connecticut case wherein the state supreme court evaluated the impact of Medicaid funding on 
poor women’s lives.  See Colker, supra note 71, at 119. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
South Dakota v. Dole facilitated a disconnect that analytically sepa-
rates the individual from the conditional spending program, a divide that 
has allowed Congress to impinge on individual rights when it could not 
otherwise do so using other enumerated powers.  At a micro-level, the 
Court’s decisions have allowed government to burden the privacy right 
to obtain abortion by withholding funds in public healthcare programs.  
At the macro-level, the power to place conditions on spending has 
created an end-run that has been quite successful, as exhibited by the 
multiple pure funding statutes and conscience clause funding statutes 
that result from the Court’s decisions in McRae and Maher.  The gap that 
exists here could exist in any federal spending program, but the case of 
Medicaid is particularly notable given the fragile, disenfranchised status 
of its enrollees and given the current efforts toward healthcare reform 
that include compromising women’s reproductive rights.321 
If the federal government is to restructure healthcare programs in 
an effective, nondiscriminatory manner, the boundaries of its power to 
spend must be explored and defined.  Currently, underlying doctrines 
such as the “greater includes the lesser” theory and the positive/negative 
rights theory tend to ignore the reality of the modern government, which 
wields influence through benefits.  This Article has proposed that, for 
now at least, the Dole test can facilitate drawing such boundaries if all of 
its elements are actively analyzed by the Court.  The current focus on the 
federal-state relationship does not protect individuals in federal health-
care programs, nor does it particularly protect states.  Though individual 
rights have not appeared to be particularly important to the majority of 
the Roberts Court, protecting the states through active federalism doc-
trine may be.  This Article also has proposed that Congress can change 
this trend, in a microcosm, by eliminating the Hyde Amendment and 
other pure funding statutes as well as by balancing conscience clause 
funding statutes.  Conscience clause funding statutes in particular would 
become potentially unconstitutional under a revitalized Dole regime, as 
the ability to affect private-pay patients through federal spending truly 
pushes the envelope of the spending power. 
 
 321. See George J. Annas, Abortion Politics and Healthcare Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2589, 
2589–91 (2009), available at http://healthcarereform.nejm.org/?p=2463&query=TOC. 
